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Abstract 
This project examines the United States-Ghana relationship and how the relationship 
transformed Ghana, 1957-1966. African leaders such as Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had declared: 
"That new Africa is ready to fight its own battles and show that after all, the black man is 
capable of managing his affairs." Despite the non-alignment philosophy, Ghana was not neutral 
regarding the West and East blocs rivalry. The thesis argues that it was through the United 
States' government and private firms' contributions that Ghana was able to achieve the mark of 
a modern nation through industrialization, universal education, and the expansion of 
international trade economy.  
The United States government and the Kaiser company, a private firm, contributed to 
the development of the Volta River Project, which increased industrial activities in Ghana 
through the production of hydroelectric energy needed to supply electricity for households and 
industries. In the end, the project benefited both the United States and Ghana as Ghana moved 
towards modernization while the Kaiser Company maximized profit, and the United States 
government was able to counter the Soviets expansion in Ghana. President John F. Kennedy's 
Peace Corps and Cornell University’s programs expanded the Ghanaian education system by 
increasing enrolment, the number of graduates, and shaped most Ghanaians for a white-collar 
job. Ghana-American relations increased trade activities through the exchange of trade 
products. America's organization of the biggest Trade Fair in Ghana in 1961 helped Ghanaians 
to learn new skills, to acquire techniques in operating trade equipment, and to recognize the 
importance of private and smaller firms in national economy. This research fills a significant 
gap in the historiography by examining the political, social, and economic interactions between 
Ghana and America. It as well discusses governmental and private organizations' roles together 
with how personal relations among statesmen transformed Ghana into a modernized country. 
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Introduction 
 As African colonies began achieving independence during the Cold War era, 
Africans began to participate in world politics and implemented strategies for nation-
building. In the course of African countries gaining independence, some Europeans and 
Americans began to express interest in these new African countries through the forming 
of alliances. Although Europeans and the United States desired to assist the new African 
countries, foreign powers protected their parochial interests. The Europeans and the 
United States exhibited support through various means, including offering aid through 
private companies to support university education and businesses.1 According to Jay 
Lovestone, an American trade union leader, "Africa has become the real battleground 
and the next field of the big test of strength, not only for the free world and the 
Communist world but for our own country and our allies who are colonialist powers."2 
 No country was more central to this battleground than Ghana. Achieving 
independence in 1957 after a painful colonial past, Ghanaians sought self-sufficiency 
and sovereignty. However, Ghana realized its goals could not be achieved without help 
from the outside world (foreign countries). Thus, with extreme trepidation, Ghana's 
leaders faced the irony of depending on other nations to help Ghana achieve political 
and economic independence. In the early 1960s, Ghana forged an awkward but 
temporarily fruitful relationship with the United States. This alliance yielded real gains, 
but it was also beset by frequent tensions that ultimately undermined a relationship that 
was perhaps doomed from the start.  
  
 1Moses Awinsong Allor, "The Power of the Periphery: Aid, Mutuality and Cold War U. S-Ghana 
Relations, 1957-1966" (MA Thesis, Eastern Illinois University, 2017), 1. 
2John C. Stoner, “We Will Follow a Nationalist Policy, But We Will Be Neutral: American Labor and 
Neutralism in Cold War Africa, 1957-1962” in American Labor’s Global Ambassador: The International 
History of the AFL-CIO During the Cold War, eds. Robert Anthony Waters, and Geert Van Geothem 
(New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2013): 240. 
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 The beginning of America's relations with Africa dates to the transatlantic slave 
trade period in the seventeenth century. A group of African slaves was shipped to the 
United States.3 Nevertheless, the United States did not have much influence on Africa 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century due to European dominance as the 
colonial masters of Africa. The dominance of the Europeans declined after World War 
II. After the Second World War, a new global awareness, and the need to compete with 
the Soviet Union spurred the United States' relations with Africa into a new phase. 
Superpower competition between Russia and America compelled the United States to 
take a new look at Africa. Russia sought to spread its communist ideology while the 
United States hoped to spread its capitalist philosophy. The United States and Russia's 
geopolitical competition created the Cold War.4  
 During the Cold War, African leaders, countries, and Africans were faced with 
having to decide with which of the blocs to form an alliance. Most African nations opted 
to remain aloof from the Cold War. African leaders emphasized independence, 
neutrality, and positive non-alignment. The president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, 
declared: "That new Africa is ready to fight its own battles and show that after all, the 
black man is capable of managing his affairs."5 However, the drive to create a 
modernized and developed nation presented significant challenges for the newly 
independent nation. Initially, Ghana had a powerful trade relationship with most 
neighboring countries in Africa. Nonetheless, lack of experienced professionals coupled 
with financial challenges- marks of many new nations—slowed Ghana’s development. 
  
3Alusine Jalloh and Toyin Falola, The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations 
(Rochester: University Rochester Press, 2008), 1. 
4“Race Relations in the United States and American Cultural and Informational Programs in Ghana, 
1957–1966,” National Archives, August 15, 2016, 
https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1999/winter/us-and-ghana-1957-1966-1.html. 
5“Kwame Nkrumah Independence Speech in Ghana on 6 March 1957,” African Heritage, Accessed 
February 19, 2019, https://afrolegends.com/2012/10/04/kwame-nkrumahs-independence-speech-on-6-
march-1957/. 
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As such, Ghana sought outside leverage. It shifted back and forth, leaning at times to 
the Americans, and at other times to the Soviets. United States-Ghanaian relations, 
therefore, were hardly linear and smooth.6 
  From the declaration of the new nation's independence, the importance of 
Ghana and America's strong relations was clear from the presence of United States 
delegates and African-Americans at the ceremony inaugurating the new nation. 
Prominent African Americans, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., attended Ghana's 
1957 independence ceremony. Due to the significance the United States placed on its 
alliance with the new nation, the Eisenhower administration dispatched vice president 
Richard Nixon to attend the Independence Day ceremony. At one point, the vice 
president effusively asked observers, "How does it feel to be free." Surprisingly, the 
bystanders replied, "We would not know. We are from Alabama."7 The presence of the 
African-Americans, such as King, indicates how important the American government 
perceived the new nation, Ghana, in the future of world politics and economics. African 
Americans who honored the independence day ceremony rejected the general 
impression of Europeans and Americans. African Americans' connections with Africans 
to assist in their struggle for independence were deemed an act of disloyalty to European 
nations and America.8  
 Over the next ten years after Ghana's independence, America invested heavily 
and contributed to the transformation of the new nation. The United States invested in 
the new nation's agricultural, educational, trade, and military sectors. The United States 
benefitted from Ghana through the exploitation of its resources, and Ghana served as 
  
6“Race Relations in the United States and American Cultural and Informational Programs in Ghana, 
1957–1966,” 
7“Race Relations in the United States and American Cultural and Informational Programs in Ghana, 
1957–1966,” 
8Kevin Gaines, American Africans in Ghana Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 9-10. 
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the home for Peace Corps volunteers, NGOs, missionaries, and other American 
organizations. Ghana had little to offer to the outside world, and it leaned on America's 
investment for its industrial development, trade interaction, educational development, 
and the growth of its infrastructures.  
 This thesis argues that it was through Ghana's relationship with the United 
States during the first decade of the new country's birth that the quest for a modern 
nation was achieved. Ghana's relations with America aided in Ghana's goal of self-
sufficiency. The thesis posits that personal relations, rather than wholly economic and 
national interest played a pivotal role in Kennedy's assistance to Ghana and contributed 
towards the nation’s transformation. During the decolonization era, the formation of 
relations with a country with a strong economy became key in transforming the “Third 
World” nations. African leaders wanted to transform their nation and experience the 
modernize level of the Western and Eastern powers. Hence, Ghana’s initial relations 
with foreign powers were strongly guided by the need to satisfy industrialization, 
universal education, and promote international trade. Ghanaians sought to advance their 
political, economic, and social systems to surpass what they had inherited from the 
colonial master.  
 Nkrumah had declared non-alignment and positive neutrality, yet it was through 
the support of the United States government, private companies, and his friend, 
Kennedy, that his quest for a modern Ghana materialized. Over the next ten years, when 
Nkrumah was in power, Ghana's social, economic, and political systems grew 
competitively. Ghana spent more than 100 years under the British hegemony and 
colonial legacies provided political, social, and economic systems in Ghana. However, 
Ghana's relations with Britain did not ensure significant development by 1957. Ghana's 
relations with the United States in the post-independence era played a pivotal role in 
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shaping the new country. Ghana grew to surpass that of many "Third World" countries. 
The new country experienced significant progress in terms of science and technology, 
professionalization, urbanization, industrialization, centralization of the state 
institutions, mass democracy, and public education. The progresses Ghana attained 
were indicators of what Michel Foucault describes as elements of modernity.9  
 From the 1950s, the development of universal education, industrialization, 
professionalization, centralization of the state institutions, existence of democratic 
institutions, free-market capitalism, individualism, artistic progress, and international 
trade characterized the idea of a modernized nation. Modernization became much 
popular in the minds of the people in the “Third World” during the Cold War Era. 
Nkrumah wanted Ghana to achieve the height of these transformations in a short time 
as a mark of a modern nation in the Cold War period. While modernized nations existed 
in the world before the Cold War period, many countries in the “Third World” were not 
modernized when measured along the lines of industrialization, universal education, 
international trade, scientific and technological progress.10   
 The United States influenced and was influenced by Ghana's political, social, 
and economic developments as the two nations interacted with each other. Personal 
relationships among statesmen coupled with the economic interest and America's 
national interest to intervene in the "Third World" shaped American and Ghanaian 
relations. Although America-Ghana relations encountered significant obstacles en route 
to Ghana's modernization, the Ghanaian and American culture shaped the relationship 
between the two nations. The Ghanaian culture of being generally friendly while 
maintaining non-alignment in the acceptance of support from other foreign powers 
  
9Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1977), 170–77.  
10Greg Barnhisel, “Perspective USA and the Cultural Cold War: Modernism in Service of the State,” 
Modernism/modernity 14 no. 4 (November 2007): 730-734.  
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shaped Ghana's foreign policies.11 The American dream that each American must have 
the freedom to achieve a better life, also guided American foreign relations. The 
American political culture that Alexis de Tocqueville described in the 1830s as 
characterized by elements such as liberty, equality, democracy, individualism, the rule 
of law, nationalism, capitalism, and open markets shaped American relations with 
Ghana.12  
 This project focuses on the first decade after Ghana's independence (1957-
1966), essentially the period of Kwame Nkrumah's tenure as the head of Ghana. The 
study examines the United States' contributions to shaping Ghana's transition after 
independence. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the political, social, and economic 
influence of the United States on Ghana and how Ghana influenced the United States 
together with Ghanaian receptiveness (and sometimes resistance) to that guidance. It 
analyzes three areas of influence: the development of the Volta River Project (modeled 
on the American Tennessee Valley Authority), the creation of a national education 
system through the Peace Corps program, and other policies by both governmental and 
private organizations, and the strengthening of anti-communist trade relations. The 
study intends to show how the United States contributed to Nkrumah's quest to 
modernize Ghana through industrialization, universal education, and trade relations.  
Organization of the Study 
 Chapter One describes Ghana-America interaction by focusing on the 
development of the Volta River Project (modeled on the American T.V.A.). It details 
the background to the construction of the Volta River Project, and the developmental 
role of the United States, the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company, the Volta 
  
11UShistory.org, “American Political Attitudes and Participation.” American Political Culture: American 
Government Online Textbook, Accessed February 29, 2020, https://www.ushistory.org/gov/4a.asp.   
12UShistory.org, “American Political Attitudes and Participation,”   
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Aluminum Company (VALCO), and other organizations. Additionally, it examines the 
benefits the project created for the United States, Ghana, and the various organizations 
involved in the interaction. Chapter Two provides a detailed discussion on U.S. support 
in building the Ghanaian educational system. The chapter examines the colonial system 
of education, its post-independence challenges, Nkrumah's educational vision, the 
contributions of the Peace Corps program towards Ghana's education system and the 
challenges both the United States government and volunteer teachers faced during the 
Peace Corps period. This chapter also reveals how Cornell University, as a separate 
institution in the United States, contributed to Ghana's educational system during the 
first decade. Chapter Three details the strengthening of anti-communist trade relations. 
The chapter examines the interaction between the American government, private 
organizations, individuals, and Ghana. It also discusses potential trade interactions, the 
United States Trade Fair, the activities of American statesmen in Ghana, and the status 
of Ghana's trade relations at the end of Nkrumah’s era. Finally, Chapter Four offers and 
ties together the three areas of development as conclusions. 
Historiography 
  Over the years, historians have developed an interest in examining United States 
foreign policies in Africa during the Cold War era. Several historical studies have 
examined United States' interactions with African countries, especially Ghana. Most of 
the existing literature focuses on state-state relationships while ignoring the interactions 
between private organizations in the United States and Ghanaian relations. Moreover, 
some scholars have prioritized national ideology and economic interests as the only 
significant areas of America-Africa relations. These studies tend to ignore how 
Ghanaian and American statesmen’s relationship influenced other areas of Ghana’s 
development. 
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 In her 2013 book, Foreign Intervention in Africa, From the Cold War to the 
War on Terror, African specialist Elizabeth Schmidt argues that during the Cold War, 
nations formed bilateral and multilateral relations. Each nation's alliances centered on 
the benefits the nation envisaged to obtain from the others. Developing countries 
formed alliances to obtained assistance in helping them modernize. Schmidt posits that 
political competition among the various powers influenced European interest in Africa. 
She asserts that economic interests and not personal relationships guided state-to-state 
interactions.13 Schmidt argues that Africa's path to modernization was not dependent 
on the relationship with the United States or any other foreign power. For Schmidt, the 
impression that Africans were the cause of all their problems is erroneous. Africa's 
problems were a direct result of the influence of foreign nations, Schmidt asserts. She 
avers that the powerful nations aimed to manipulate African nations to satisfy 
superpower political, economic, and social interests. America, Russia, and various 
European powers did not promote Africans' desire for modernization.14  
 Schmidt argues that powerful nations were encroachers who sought to 
monopolize African politics, economics, and social affairs for the benefit of foreign 
nations. Her argument reinterprets the nature of the relationship which existed between 
African nations and the various world powers during the Cold War era. According to 
her, foreign nations intervened in Africa to ensure the parochial interest of foreign 
powers. She cautions historians to stop blaming Africans for their predicaments. In 
some instances, the Cold War could be described as an invasion of Africa by 
superpowers.  
  
13Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1. 
14Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa, xiii. 
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 We as historians must understand that, whereas the superpowers sought to 
promote their own national interests through their interactions with Africa, they also 
played a significant role in transforming Africa. Foreign powers served as interveners 
in shaping newly independent nations that faced diverse problems at the time of their 
independence. Some foreign aid was aimed at reducing the poverty rate in newly 
independent nations. African nations were agents who, at certain times for the sake of 
their interests, negotiated alliances with outsiders. Schmidt's view sharply differs since 
she believed foreign powers were encroachers in Africa, and the powers only sought 
their national interest. She did not highlight the contributions of nations such as the 
United States towards the development of some African countries like Ghana. Ghana 
benefited significantly from their connection to foreign powers. This project discusses 
how the United States, an outsider, contributed significantly to Ghana's transition to 
industrialization and modernization. 
In contrast to Schmidt's view, some scholars have also argued that President 
Kennedy's aid to Africa was an act of genuine sympathy aimed at building Africa as a 
continent. In his book, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John 
F. Kennedy, American political scientist Richard Walton argues that Kennedy 
genuinely showed empathy towards African nations. The young president accepted 
Africa's neutralism and sympathized with their desire for total independence. He also 
respected their sense of nationalism and tried to abstain from influencing Africa during 
the Cold War era, Walton posits. Kennedy sponsored the Volta River Project due to his 
empathy for Africa despite domestic resistance coupled with Nkrumah's attacks and 
policies towards the United States. Kennedy sought to prove to Africans that the United 
States did not demand political loyalty in return for economic and political aid. Walton 
was silent on other factors that motivated Kennedy's agenda, such as the president's 
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relations with Nkrumah and K.A. Gbedemah. Moreover, Walton did not emphasize 
how Edgar Kaiser's relations with Nkrumah influenced American support for the 
Ghanaian Volta project.15  
Scholars such as Thomas Noer, an expert in the history of the United States 
foreign policy argues in his article, "The New Frontier and African Neutralism: 
Kennedy, Nkrumah, and the Volta River Project," that ideological grounds influenced 
the United States interactions with African nations during Kennedy's regime. America's 
interactions with Africa considered the foreign and domestic policies of all African 
nations. Whereas Kennedy had initially rejected the idea of supporting African nations, 
he later changed his policies towards Africa in a short time. Noer avers that Kennedy 
decided to support the Volta River Project in Ghana due to Nkrumah's acceptance of 
America's conditions of economics, politics, and international cooperation.16 
To Noer, Nkrumah's quest to build a dam to generate hydroelectric power and 
process aluminum influenced his decision to seek financial support from the United 
States. Before seeking America's assistance, Nkrumah requested support from the 
British, who declined due to an excess of aluminum on the world market. Noer also 
asserts that Nkrumah asked the World Bank and the Aluminum Company Limited of 
Canada for their support. They too rejected the appeal due to the huge amount needed 
for the development of the project. Nkrumah then sought for help from American 
investors to finance the project. These investors showed some limited interest at the 
initial stage due to the high cost involved in the building of the project. Nkrumah's 
  
 15Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New 
York: Viking Press, 1972), 3-8. 
16Thomas J. Noer, “The New Frontier and African Neutralism: Kennedy, Nkrumah, and the Volta 
River Project,” Diplomatic History 8, no. 1 (1984): 61-62  
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intent to industrialize Ghana influenced him to accept an offer in which Americans' 
political and economic conditions were attached.17  
Noer’s work posits that American support to the newly independent and 
decolonized nations on the African continent, specifically Ghana, became the prime mover 
in building Ghana as a modern nation.18 Noer's study reveals that the United States' 
intervention in Africa during the Cold War era was guided by American interests over the 
interests of the African nations though American aid supported the development of the 
new African nations. As seen in the case of Ghana, the new nation in her desire for 
financial support succumbed to the desires of the United States at the expense of their 
neutrality and non-alignment policy. Although ideological policies shaped the interaction 
between the two leaders, it seems the personal relations between Nkrumah and Kennedy 
might have made things easy in the completion of the dam project. Noer did not emphasize 
the role of personal relations in American-Ghanaian relationship, which this project will 
address. 
An African historian, Moses Awinsong in his project "The Power of the 
Periphery: Aid, Mutuality and Cold War U.S.-Ghana Relations, 1957-1966," argues that 
whereas the United States aided the new nation in building a modern nation; this took 
place on an interactive plane as opposed to the United States intervening to promote its 
version of modernity.19 The United States military, financial, and social assistance given 
to Ghana were not solely guided by the United States’ policy to intervene in Africa. 
Americans weighed the benefit they could derive from assisting African nations and the 
contributions the United States could make towards the new nations. America benefited 
  
17Noer, “The New Frontier and African Neutralism,” 63. 
18See below for the above-mentioned scholars and their views on the United States Policies towards 
African Nations during the Cold War Era.  
 19Awinsong, “The Power of the Periphery: Aid, Mutuality and Cold War U. S-Ghana Relations, 1957-
1966,” 1. 
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from African nations such as Nigeria and Ghana, while Ghana, Nigeria, and some African 
countries also aided the achievement of American political and economic interests in 
Africa. Although the United States prioritized America's interest in its policies towards 
Africa, the United States' assistance to the newly independent nation contributed to 
transforming Ghana. Awinsong's project did not explicitly examine how America 
contributed to transforming Ghana. Moreover, the role of the relations among the 
statesmen of the two countries was not highlighted. 
In his book, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966, Diplomacy, Ideology, and the 
New State, Scott W. Thompson, a British professor of International politics, argues that 
the United States' intentions in Ghana were centered on the need to aid African nations to 
develop. While Kennedy's administration sought to support Ghana, only nations that 
shared a similar view with the United States Cold War policy were to receive foreign 
assistance, Scott posits.20  According to Scott, before the United States intervention, 
Nkrumah sought help from Middle Eastern countries. However, he was turned down since 
these nations also perceived the cost of the Volta River Project to be too high. America's 
commitment to supporting Ghana was enough to convince Nkrumah that the Volta scheme 
could be developed, Scott avers.21  
 On July 1, 1960, during Ghana's Republic Day, Ghana received a letter from 
Kennedy, which stated that the United States intended to support Ghana. Nonetheless, the 
support was dependent on World Bank feasibility rulings. In September 1961, Kennedy 
began to review Ghana's request to build the Volta River Project.22 Scott avers that from 
early 1964, however, following Kennedy’s assassination, Nkrumah's attitude toward the 
United States became more hostile. Kennedy's sympathetic policy was buried with him, and 
  
20Thompson W. Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966, Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State 
(Princeton: University Press, 1969), 190. 
21Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966, 44.  
22Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966, 190. 
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the transformation became manifested in Washington and Accra. Upon Kennedy’s death, 
newly installed president Lyndon B. Johnson who expressed a strong dislike for the 
uncertainty of African leaders, succeeded Kennedy.23 Scott highlights the role of personal 
relations between Nkrumah and Kennedy in shaping Ghana's interaction with the United 
States. The transition in the United States government, which ushered in Johnson, a man 
who had less interest in African states since he believed they had little to offer, altered the 
relationship which the two nations had built. Hence, the introduction of a new leader whose 
relationship with Nkrumah was not perfect began to decline the relations between the two 
countries. Personal relations overshadowed national ideology. This study will highlight how 
personal relations played an instrumental role in Ghana-America relations during days when 
national ideology could not work. Moreover, this study will go beyond state-state interaction 
and discuss how private organizations and some individuals contributed to transforming 
Ghana. 
 Although a growing number of scholars have contributed to the historiography of 
the United States and Ghanaian relationships, they rarely addressed the interactions among 
the private organizations and the interactions among some Ghanaian and American 
individuals. Moreover, most of the existing literature fail to highlight the role of personal 
relationships among statesmen in shaping United States-Ghanaian interactions. Historians 
have generally focused on state-to-state interactions and interventions without addressing 
the interactions and interventions of specific private institutions and individuals. This study 
seeks to fill the gap in the historiography by addressing the intervention and interactional 
roles of the leaders of the two nations and the private organizations that had interest in Ghana 
during the first decade following the new nation’s independence. This thesis shows that not 
only were U.S.-Ghanaian relations determined through state-to-state encounters, but also 
  
23Scott, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, 300-301. 
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through interactions between and among private organizations and individuals from both 
countries. Also, the project shows how personal relations among various statesmen at times 
overshadowed economics and ideology.  
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 The Volta River Project 
 The Volta River Project is a large hydroelectric complex industry that 
contributed to Ghana's key to industrial development, prosperity, and modernization. 
The project consists of a high dam known as the Akosombo Dam, a powerhouse that 
was scheduled to produce 589 MW electrical energy at the initial stage of the project, 
and 883 MW by the final stage. The project included a transmission system that was 
intended to produce electrical energy for the Tema Aluminum smelter, the mining 
sector, and Ghanaians in the cities and villages in Southern Ghana.1 By 1966, the Volta 
scheme became Ghana's only most significant investment in social overhead capital, 
meant to galvanize the industrialization of Ghana.2 Initially, Ghanaians recognized that 
such an ambitious undertaking depended on United States' support. The Tennessee 
Valley Authority hydroelectric project, a grass-roots development, served as a model 
for United States' overseas development projects, and shaped the readiness of the 
United States to cooperate in the development of the Volta project.3 The Congo crisis, 
Soviet's effort to disrupt America's interaction, opposition to the Kennedy 
administration, and Kennedy's assassination delayed the completion of the project. 
Nkrumah’s attacks on the United States, since he believed the West was willing to use 
any means to gain power in Africa, also slowed down the development of the Volta 
scheme.4 
  
1Ghana Information Services Department, Ghana Reborn (Ghana Information Service: New York, 
December 1966), 58. 
2Kwamina Barnes, Economics of Volta River Project (Legon, Ghana: University Bookshop, 1966), 2. 
3David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American 
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 14-40, 65. 
4Letter, President Eisenhower to President Nkrumah,” August 7, 1960, Foreign Relations of the United 
States (hereafter FRUS), 1958-1960, vol.14, eds. Glenn W. LaFantasie and Harriet Dashiell Schwar  
(Washington, DC: US Gov. Print. Off, 1992), doc. 298.  
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 Nonetheless, the development of the project succeeded because of personal 
relationships—rather than relationships that were driven solely by ideological or 
economical considerations. The Ghanaian culture of openness and the willingness to 
corporate while doing things themselves shaped Ghana-American relations. Even from 
some Canadians’ perspective, Ghanaians value the act of greeting and their ritual of 
greeting is lengthier than what exists in Canada. Hand shaking is a special act in Ghana 
and the use of the left hand is culturally unacceptable in Ghana. Ghanaians usually ask 
about the well-being of families, friends, and even foreigners. Ghanaians are seen to be 
generally helpful and welcoming to even strangers. Over the years, Ghana has been 
identified as a friendly country and a region more welcoming for first time travelers in 
Africa. 5 On the other hand, the American dream of helping all people to achieve a 
better life shaped the United States’ foreign policies during Kennedy’s administration. 
The relationships between Nkrumah and Kennedy, and Nkrumah and Edgar Kaiser 
allowed for the development of the project. 
  Edgar Fosburgh Kaiser Sr., born on July 29, 1908 was an American capitalist 
who became the head of the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, and 
contributed massively to the development of the Volta scheme. This chapter argues that 
Ghana's interactions with the United States during the first decade of the new nation 
helped in launching Ghana towards industrialization. America supported the newly 
independent nation's goal of industrialization. Ghana's development of the Volta River 
Project and its facets created employment, and scientific and technological progress. 
This chapter presents a historical overview of the Volta River Project, Nkrumah's vision 
for it, the purpose for the project, and United States-Ghanaian interactions in setting up 
  
5Global Affairs Canada, “Ghana” Accessed on May 19, 2020 https://www.international.gc.ca/cil-
cai/country_insights-apercus_pays/ci-ic_gh.aspx?lang=eng#cn-8. 
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the hydroelectric project. State-to-state interactions are examined together with the 
personal relations among statesmen and how they played a role in completing the Volta 
River scheme. Kaiser Company, an American aluminum company, is examined 
together with other corporations that contributed towards the completion of the project.  
Historical overview of the Volta River Project 
 The idea of constructing the Volta River Project first came into being through 
the discoveries of Sir Albert Kitson, director of the Gold Coast Geological Survey, an 
initiative based in London. Though on a mission to discover new mineral reserves in 
Ghana, he discovered the site that was later used for the development of the Volta 
scheme. After the formation of the Gold Coast Department of Geological Surveys in 
1913, Kitson journeyed to the Gold Coast as the first director of the Geological Surveys. 
The Gold Coast Department of Geological Surveys charged Kitson with discovering 
other mineral reserves in the mountains and forests of the Gold Coast, aside from the 
existence of gold.6 Kitson discovered the wealthy industrial diamond deposits at 
Akwatia, a region that is still a rough diamond center in present-day Ghana. He also 
found iron ore deposits located at Shieni, near what was to become Lake Volta.  
 Credit must be given to Mr. Duncan E. Rose, a private expatriate geologist, who 
chanced on a copy of Kitson's proposal in a public library in Johannesburg in 1938 and 
flew to Ghana a few months later. Rose re-assessed the proposal to build the Volta 
scheme. He considered the recommendations to build the Volta project after making 
minor changes and adding a proposal for constructing a harbor at Ada to facilitate the 
movement of deep ocean vessels. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Second World War 
disrupted any further steps and the scientific research needed for the development of 
the project. In 1944, work on the project resumed when English investor Duncan Rose 
  
6James Moxon, Volta; Man's Greatest Lake (New York: Praeger, 1969), 49. 
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established a company called West African Aluminum Limited and obtained the right 
to mine bauxite from the colonial government.7  
 Even after Ghana’s independence, Britain wanted to support the development 
of the Volta scheme and desired to benefit from the Volta scheme’s profit. Nonetheless, 
in 1958, the British Government rescinded its decision to support the project following 
an increase in the British bank rate, which made the funding needed to support the 
project expensive. Moreover, the low value of aluminum on the world market 
discouraged the colonial government from supporting the project. Hitherto, the British 
government had withdrawn from the Aswan dam project in Egypt. The Aswan High 
Dam development which began in 1960 under the leadership of Egyptian leader Gamal 
Abdel Nasser was also scheduled to enhance the generation of electricity, provide water 
to Egyptians, and reduce flooding. Britain’s withdrawal from the Aswan Dam was due 
to the high cost involved in building the Egyptian project and the limited benefits 
Britain was to gain in return. In the case of Ghana, the colonial government expressed 
similar reluctancy to support the project with huge funds and that prevented any real 
development of the project, thereby pushing Nkrumah to consult the United States for 
its assistance in developing the project. Nkrumah’s desire to complete the Volta project 
made him use any possible means to gain support for the development of the project.8  
Nkrumah and the Volta River Project 
 Following Ghana's independence in 1957 and the election of Nkrumah as the 
prime minister, Nkrumah became the pioneer for the project, and the project entered a 
new phase. During the 1951 electioneering campaign, Nkrumah had promised 
Ghanaians that he would complete the Volta River Project when elected to office.  
  
7Barnes, Economics of Volta River Project, 2.   
8Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, 1st ed (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 571.    
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 The colonial government was initially interested in building the project, but it 
was motivated more by the intent of making a profit for the British government than to 
industrialize the colony. Hence, it withdrew when it realized the cost involved in 
developing the Volta scheme was higher. The colonial government envisaged 
developing a scheme that would increase its foreign reserve and maximize profit. The 
colonial authority did not prioritize the interest of the colony to industrialize and 
transform as an African nation in the building of the project. The British government 
pulled back in 1958 when the expenses for the project increased, following the fall in 
aluminum price in 1956.9 Under the colonial authority, Ghana's economic ties with 
other nations were limited. Natural resources and all projects were to serve the interest 
of the colonial authority, not Ghana nor Ghanaians. Kwame Nkrumah's central goal for 
the project was to create an automated program that could transform Ghana into an 
industrialized and modernized nation within a short time following political 
independence. Nkrumah wanted to make Ghana economically independent in order to 
make the nation's political independence meaningful. He believed political 
independence would be useless without economic independence. Nkrumah believed 
that any form of national development was dependent on economic independence. 
Nkrumah sought to encourage the development of factories to aid Ghanaian businesses 
in the production of commodities needed for Ghanaians' consumption.10 
 While Nkrumah had declared policies of non-alignment and positive neutrality, 
he was aware the new nation could not finance the project alone. The reluctance of the 
British government pushed Nkrumah to rely on support from other foreign powers. The 
  
9Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” Kwame Nkrumah 
and Information and Resource Site, Government of Ghana: Accra. Accessed January 2, 2020,  
https://www.nkrumah.net/gov-pubs/gp-a1357-61-62/gen.php?index=0, 2.     
10Iain Jackson et al., “The Volta River Project: Planning, Housing and Resettlement in Ghana, 1950–
1965,” The Journal of Architecture, 24 (2019): 512. 
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United States was ready to support Ghana to prevent the new country from soliciting 
assistance from the Soviets, whose national ideology was opposite to the United States’ 
own. Moreover, America wanted to use Ghana as the nursery for the cultivation of the 
United States capitalist ideology.  
 The greatest challenge to the creation of the project had to do with financing 
the project. The development of the project coincided with a period when interest rates 
on loans and the duration for loan repayments had become challenging. Moreover, 
production power temporarily outran the world's demand for aluminum.11 The project 
was delayed due to the various difficulties until the various leaders overcame them and 
moved to begin the development of the Volta scheme.12  
The Purpose of the Volta River Project  
 On Tuesday, February 21, 1961, Nkrumah appeared before the National 
Assembly and discussed the Volta River Project. He called for a debate to endorse the 
plan for implementation to expedite negotiations to facilitate the beginning of the 
project in 1961. According to Nkrumah, the industrial sector of a nation's economy 
depended on a high and dependable source of power, just as European nations, Canada, 
Russia, America, and other nations' industrialization had depended on the creation of 
power.13 
 Nkrumah believed the purpose of the project was to supply power and 
transmission systems that would relieve Ghana of one obstacle on its road to 
industrialization. Power would be evenly distributed for sale to every firm in Ghana. 
Besides, the supply of adequate and reliable sources of power was scheduled to move 
  
11Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 2-3. 
12Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 2-3. 
13Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 1. 
  
 21 
  
machinery and provide power process materials. Also, a constant supply of power 
would provide electric energy to operate chemical processes and to supply power for 
the aluminum smelter and other materials.14 The American Tennessee Valley Authority 
(T.V.A.) project became a popular model for development globally. The T.V.A. 
became a model for America's modernization of the "Third World" during the Cold 
War. The Tennessee project led to the development of dams and other technologies to 
enhance modernization. Electrification projects had been developed along rivers in the 
United States, Vietnam, and other places as sources of power for modernization. The 
T.V.A. was viewed to address the needs and help solve the problems of developing 
countries.15 
 The smelting industry, and the jobs it was to create would also provide a new 
industry for the Ghanaian economy. The aluminum smelter was to reduce the 
unemployment situation in Ghana. It would employ the services of about 1,500 people 
when it begins operation. Besides, foreign companies would be responsible for the 
payment of company taxes to the Ghanaian government. At the same time, the Volta 
scheme would as well pay the Volta River Authority about 2.5 million pounds per 
annum for electricity supply.16 Also, the development of the scheme would improve 
Ghana's foreign exchange rates from sales derived from the operations of the smelter. 
Ghana would be exporting electricity and materials provided from the operations of the 
smelter. The development of the smelter would introduce alumina powder that 
produced aluminum metal. Alumna powder would be produced through the 
  
14Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 6. 
15David Ekbladh, “`Mr. TVA’: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the 
Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for US Overseas Development, 1933–1973,” Diplomatic 
History 26, no. 3 (2002): 335-336. 
16Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 6. 
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transmission of a large amount of electricity through the powder to melt out metal. The 
process generates electricity.17  
The Kaiser Corporation and the Volta River Project 
 The Kaiser corporation contributed immensely to the development of the Volta 
scheme. The Kaiser corporation was not just an aluminum company; the Kaiser 
company also built hydroelectric plants. Moreover, the Kaiser company had an interest 
in steel, coking coal, and fabricating steel. Additionally, it produced other essential 
products such as industrial chemicals, glass fiber, refractories, agricultural chemicals, 
zinc, lead, gypsum, and cement. As a private organization, the Kaiser group contributed 
immensely towards the development of the Volta River project.18 
 The Kaiser Corporation came onto the scene through the recommendation of 
the International Co-operation Administration which called for a reassessment of the 
Volta River project. The International Co-operation Administration recommended that 
an engineering company thoroughly examined the engineering requirement and 
presented the potential economic benefits of the project. The Kaiser corporation 
assessed the project and issued a Reassessment Report that recommended the 
construction of the Dam at Akosombo instead of Ajena. Moreover, the report 
recommended the development of a hydroelectric station at Bui. The government of 
Ghana had already entered into an agreement with the Soviets for both designing and 
the construction of a hydroelectric station at Bui. The initial idea of the Soviets’ project 
sought to provide maximum electricity supply from the dam to an aluminum smelter 
and a small section of the Ghanaian population. The Kaiser Reassessment Report 
recommended the creation of a national electricity provider. The national electricity 
  
17Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 6. 
18David Hart, The Volta River Project: A Case Study in Politics and Technology (Edinburgh: University 
Press, 1980), 46. 
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provider would supply a significant part of Southern Ghana-Tema via Accra, Cape 
Coast, Takoradi, Tarkwa, Dunkwa, Kumasi, Koforidua, and return to Akosombo.19 
President Nkrumah established personal relations with Henry Kaiser, the head of the 
Kaiser firm, after the Kaiser company had presented the Reassessment Report. The 
relationship between Nkrumah and Kaiser shaped the Volta project for the next decade. 
Nkrumah's personality as an outspoken, robust, dynamic, ambitious, innovative, 
friendly, and goal-oriented leader were traits that Henry Kaiser also bore. These 
connections between the two leaders sustained their relationship and allowed Ghana to 
achieve the total support of the Kaiser Corporation, a private organization.  
 Following the establishment of rapport with the Kaiser corporation, Nkrumah 
asked the company to form an aluminum company in Ghana that would make use of 
the power produced by the dam project. Nkrumah's request later resulted in the creation 
of the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO).20 
 The Kaiser Cooperation had its own ambitions: maximizing of profits. This 
motivated the company to support the development of the Volta River Project. The 
Kaiser group envisaged contributing to Ghana's industrialization. Nevertheless, the 
company prioritized its own profit maximization. The Kaiser corporation's involvement 
in the project would ensure the production of low-cost hydroelectricity. It would also 
provide access to an ample supply of Ghana's bauxites. The electricity to be produced 
would be accessible to all Ghanaians at a cheaper rate. The Kaiser corporation's access 
to the Ghanaian bauxite would maximize the newly independent country's foreign 
exchange and shape Ghana towards industrialization.21  
  
19Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 4.  
20Kofi Adlai Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, 
Objectives, and Consequences of Ghana’s Volta River Project.” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Ghana, 
Legon Accra, 1969), 51. 
21Hart, The Volta River Project, 49.  
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 Henry Kaiser retired at age 74 in 1956, and his son Edgar Kaiser became the 
leader of the Kaiser companies. Henry, however, continued to be active in the decision 
making of the Kaiser industries. On July 28, 1958, Nkrumah had his first meeting with 
Edgar Kaiser. Like his father, Edgar was a robust, innovative, and dynamic person. 
Nkrumah's possession of these traits helped sustain his relations with Edgar. Nkrumah's 
popularity inside and outside Africa due to his nationalistic activities in Africa and other 
“Third World” nations aided the building of trust for Nkrumah. During their initial 
meeting, Nkrumah and Kaiser quickly built a rapport. During the conversation between 
Nkrumah and Edgar Kaiser, a member of the Kaiser Corporation said that Nkrumah 
speaks like Edgar's father, Henry Kaiser. Nkrumah heard the comment and broke into 
laughter. The personal relations built between Edgar Kaiser and Nkrumah at their first 
meeting was influential in the development of the new country's industrialization 
ambitions. During this period, Halcrow, a British private firm, had begun building the 
Tema project, and it connected firmly with the Kaiser Cooperation. Both companies 
equally sought to maximize profit by associating with the industrialization process. 
Nkrumah inspired Kaiser with his enthusiasm, and that made Kaiser develop a keen 
interest in the development of the project, both to benefit his own company and to 
modernize Ghana. Nkrumah and Kaiser's relations galvanized the scheme after 1958 as 
the Kaiser corporation maximize profits while contributing to Ghana's launch towards 
modernization.22  
 Representatives of the Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corporation, together with 
the Aluminum Limited of Canada (ALCAN), Reynolds Metals, the Aluminum 
Company of America (ALCOA), and Olin Mathieson, met in September 1959 and 
  
22David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1988), 155-156. 
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formed a limited liability firm which became known as the Volta Aluminum 
Company(VALCO) to ensure the development of the Volta scheme.23 In December 
1959, President Nkrumah and D.A. Rhodes, the then president of the Kaiser Aluminum 
and Chemical Corporation, on behalf of the VALCO Company, signed a "letter of 
intent" stating that VALCO had agreed on paper to partake in the Volta River Project.  
The agreement between the government of Ghana and VALCO shows some level of 
changes in the Ghanaian government's trade policies. The Legislative House had 
approved and made provision for the encouragement of private companies to invest in 
Ghana. Since VALCO, a private enterprise was a world-renowned aluminum company, 
the agreement signaled to the outside world the willingness of the Ghanaian 
government to partner with private institutions. The government of Ghana's contract 
with VALCO, a private company, helped erase the misconception of those who had 
doubts about such a possibility.24 The VALCO company, which the Kaiser corporation 
founded contributed immensely to Ghana's industrialization through the production of 
aluminum ingots.25 Although the economic interests of the Kaiser company were taken 
into consideration in the establishment of VALCO, Ghana's goal for modernization and 
industrialization materialized through the pivotal roles the Kaiser corporation, a private 
firm, played in Ghana.26 
Edgar Kaiser still supported the project despite the huge figures needed to 
finance the scheme. Edgar's relationship with Nkrumah made the Kaiser company 
support the project irrespective of the amount needed in the development of the project. 
  
23Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, Objectives, and 
Consequences of Ghana’s Volta River Project,” 51. 
24Ghana Government, “The Volta River Project: A Statement by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
President of the Republic of Ghana to the National Assembly, February 21, 1961,” 6. 
25Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, Objectives, and 
Consequences of Ghana’s Volta River Project,” 51. 
26Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, Objectives, and 
Consequences of Ghana’s Volta River Project,” 51. 
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The Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) and Olin Mathieson in East Alton, 
Illinois, had supported the project as a means of making a profit and to help Ghana's 
goal of becoming economically independent. However, in early 1960, both ALCOA 
and Olin Mathieson stepped away from their decision to support the project. These 
companies rescinded their decisions due to the high cost involved in funding the project. 
The Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corporation, and Reynolds Metals, which still showed 
interest in contributing to the project, arrived at a consensus to construct and run the 
smelter at the cost of 90 percent and 10 percent, respectively.27  
 Due to the need to finance the project, the World Bank entered the picture. After 
the World Bank had investigated the plan, it recommended that the highest amount 
Ghana could borrow was £190 million. Such a recommendation raised concerns due to 
the enormous amount needed to develop the project. Kaiser, as the head of the Kaiser 
company, expressed interest in supporting Nkrumah in transforming Ghana into a 
modernized and industrialized nation to compete with other developed countries. 
Nevertheless, he protected the economic interests of the Kaiser company. As a private 
company that sought to maximize profit, the profitability of the Volta scheme as well 
influenced the Kaiser corporation's support for the project while Edgar Kaiser, the 
leader of the Kaiser cooperation’s relationship with Nkrumah also contributed towards 
ensuring the development of the Volta project concurrently.28 
 The Kaiser company invested millions of dollars in the project to ensure its 
realization. The company hoped to receive an excellent return for the amount invested 
while supporting Ghana's transformation through scientific and technological 
innovation.29 The Kaiser corporation's interest in having access to aluminum and 
  
27Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, Objectives, and 
Consequences of Ghana’s Volta River Project,” 51.  
28Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World, 156-157. 
29Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World, 156-157. 
  
 27 
  
Ghana's bauxite also shaped its commitment to support the project. At the same time, 
the company supported the launching of Ghana's electricity development program and 
the need for industrialization. As a public corporation, the desire for profits and the 
mutual relationship Nkrumah established with each of the leaders of the Kaiser 
organization, guided the Kaiser company’s support for the Volta scheme. Even in times 
when the United States government wanted to back out due to Nkrumah's association 
with the Soviets, Kaiser continued to support the project and even advised the United 
States government to support the project as a fight against Soviet penetration.30 Ghana's 
drive to industrialization, a mark of a modern nation, was spearheaded through the 
continued backing of the Kaiser firm, through personal relations between Nkrumah and 
the respective leaders of the Kaiser corporation in the first decade of the newly 
independent country. 
The United States Government and the Volta River Project 
 United States government’s interest in contributing to the Volta River Project 
in Ghana began in the mid-1950s. Although political, economic, and ideological 
reasons shaped the United States' intent in supporting the project, personal relations 
between Nkrumah and the United States’ presidents over time as well guided the 
American assistance in Ghana's transition to industrialization. According to Sir Robert 
Gillman Allen Jackson, the British appointed special commissioner of the preparatory 
commission of the Volta project, political factors primarily motivated the United States 
to be involved in the Volta River Project. Ghana was the first nation in sub-Saharan 
Africa to gain its independence. Since the United States sought to gain political, social, 
and economic influence in Africa, supporting the project became paramount to such an 
opportunity. America's vision to gain influence in Africa grew to its zenith following 
  
30Hart, The Volta River Project, 49. 
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the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956. The Suez Crisis emerged after Britain and America 
rescinded their decision to finance the construction of the Aswan dam project. Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president nationalized the Suez Canal and that generated 
crisis in the Middle East. Hitherto, the canal was controlled by the British and the 
French. The Soviets supported the creation of the Aswan dam in Egypt following the 
withdrawal of the British and Americans.31  
 In March 1954, a group of American businessmen under the leadership of R.V. 
Wood and A. Hehmeyer came to Ghana under the United States government's requests. 
Through the United States Point Four Technical Assistance Program and with the 
acceptance from the Ghanaian government, the team was charged with the 
responsibility of examining trade and investment possibilities in Ghana. The Ghanaian 
culture of hospitality and America's desire to modernize the new nation while projecting 
its national interests shaped cooperation between the American businessmen and 
Ghanaian officials.32 Specifically, the group envisaged gaining access to, and making 
known, the economic opportunities in Ghana to promote the creation and expansion of 
African business firms. The United States government’s contribution to expanding 
Ghanaian firms would help transform the limited Ghanaian economy into an 
industrialized, global one. Moreover, the team also had an interest in the existence of 
laws related to the creation and managing of capital and sought to align trade laws with 
the needs and interests of the emerging private economies in Ghana. The modernization 
of a nation was equally dependent on the development of private economies that 
interwove with the mission of the American businessmen who came to Ghana to discuss 
  
31Hart, The Volta River Project: A Case Study in Politics and Technology, 44-5. 
 32Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, Objectives, and 
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the Volta scheme and other economic projects.33 In January 1955, the team presented a 
report to the United States government. The best investment opportunity in Ghana, the 
team concluded, was the creation of hydroelectricity and aluminum production. The 
team believed the development of the electricity project would provide Ghanaians with 
electricity, hasten industrialization in Ghana as a tool for modernization, and benefit 
the American interests.34 
 In 1956, a new development ushered in a new phase in the relationship between 
Eisenhower and Nkrumah. In October 1956, the Ghanaian Finance Minister, Komla 
Agbeli Gbedemah and his secretary, an African American, after attending the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meeting in Ottawa, visited the United States. They 
entered one of the Howard Johnson roadside restaurants in Delaware for a glass of iced 
orange juice. The waitress, supported by the restaurant manager, told Gbedemah that 
people of color were not permitted to be served at the counter, although he could be 
allowed to buy something and take it outside the eating establishment. Gbedemah said 
to the manager, “The people here are of lower social status than I am but they can drink 
here, and we can’t. You can keep the orange juice and the change, but this is not the 
last you have heard of this.”35  
 The press got hold of the story and escalated the incident. President Eisenhower 
and Vice-President Nixon moved to apologize for the situation, hence, they invited Mr. 
Gbedemah for breakfast at the White House. This unfortunate incident became pivotal 
in shaping Ghana's relations with the United States and contributed to the new country's 
road to industrialization and modernization. Eisenhower, who was interested in what 
  
33Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, Objectives, and 
Consequences of Ghana’s Volta River Project,” 50. 
34Boateng, “International Development and Communication: A Case of the Origins, Objectives, and 
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35Thayer Watkins, “The Volta River Project in Ghana, West Africa,” Accessed May 18, 2020 San Jose 
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he had heard about the Volta River Project, asked Gbedemah to provide further details 
about the project. Initially, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to support 
Ghana's ambition for the development of the Volta project until Congressional 
Democrats criticized the Eisenhower government. Congress believed Eisenhower's 
administration was not interested in Africa and that would make the United States lose 
Africa to the Soviets. The criticisms pushed Eisenhower to build a strong relationship 
with Nkrumah as a preparatory stage to American support in Ghana's industrialization. 
While initial discussions and relations were between President Eisenhower and 
Gbedemah, President Nkrumah's relationship with Eisenhower was established through 
the orange juice incident. Nkrumah wrote to President Eisenhower some days after the 
incident and indicated he and his members were passionate about the Volta River 
Project and viewed it as the vehicle for Ghana’s modernization. He also noted that his 
government was ready to negotiate with any company or government. Nkrumah sent 
President Eisenhower copies of the Preparatory Commission's Report to study.36  
 With Ghana's Independence Day celebration scheduled for March 6, 1957, 
Eisenhower's relation with Nkrumah, together with America's interest in Ghana, 
persuaded Eisenhower to appoint Vice President Nixon to represent America. The vice 
president told Ghanaians during a press conference that the United States’ government 
was interested in the Volta River Project, and that the American government desired to 
assist in modernizing Ghana. Nixon added that he had already discussed with President 
Nkrumah the proposed Volta River Project.37 
 Nkrumah officially sought friendly assistance from the United States, 
beginning with discussions with President Dwight Eisenhower in October 1957. 
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Eisenhower showed interest in the project and asked the International Co-operation 
Administration to aid in making the project look attractive. The International Co-
operation Administration recommended a re-examination of the project to assess the 
engineering part of the creation of the Volta River Project and to examine the economic 
benefits of the project. Eisenhower invited Nkrumah to visit Washington. Nkrumah's 
visit to Washington became the first time a guest from a developing country visited 
Washington, an act that was influenced by the cordial relations built between the two 
presidents.38  
 In July 1958, Nkrumah made an official visit to the United States. Prior to 
Nkrumah’s visit, Douglas Dillon, the then undersecretary of state for economic and 
agriculture affairs, asked Edgar Kaiser, and Chad Calhoun, the vice president of Kaiser 
Industries, to study the prospects of the project. Following a detailed study of the 
project, Edgar indicated that it was economically viable for the United States and 
private firms. Edgar told Eisenhower that the Volta scheme would benefit the American 
government and private industries. It would as well launch Ghana to the road of 
modernization through industrialization and an improvement in Ghana's foreign 
exchange rate.39  
 Although aluminum was abundant at the world market, Eisenhower granted his 
backing to support Ghana in the development of the Volta River scheme due to relations 
he had established with Nkrumah and the need to forestall Soviet influence in Ghana. 
From the initial stage of the development of the Volta scheme, Nkrumah had 
established connection with Eisenhower and even asked Eisenhower to use his personal 
influence to persuade Henry Kaiser to found a company to support the building of the 
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aluminum project.40 Compared to colonial authority forms of support meant to benefit 
the colonial powers only, Eisenhower's support had been guided by Ghana's need for 
industrialization while protecting America's national interests. He was aware of how 
the clumsiness of American and British policy resulted in the Soviets having power 
over the Aswan Dam in Egypt.  
 Eisenhower wanted to subvert any Soviet penetration into Africa.41 Speaking 
on the Volta scheme during Nkrumah's visit in 1958, President Eisenhower restated that 
the United States would continue to examine the possibilities of making the 
development of the project work. Eisenhower added that the United States desired to 
help the new country in transforming into a developed country through 
industrialization. He assured Nkrumah he had not forgotten Ghana and the Volta 
scheme. Nkrumah acknowledged the United States' interest and indicated his 
government would be appreciative of any support it received from the United States 
government even as Ghana also explored the possibilities of developing the project 
through the support of private aluminum companies. Even if the private companies 
were not interested in the project, Nkrumah was optimistic about the project's economic 
viability, its role in Ghana's modernization, and the potential to attract aluminum 
companies. Besides, the scheme would provide a cheap source of power upon its 
completion. Eisenhower asked if there were other services the project might provide to 
the new country. Nkrumah answered that the project would be used for small industries 
and agricultural purposes, which were also steps toward modernization.42   
  Eisenhower compared the Volta project to the Rural Electrification 
Administration, the project instituted by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 to help reduce 
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unemployment through the production of electricity to remote areas. He described how 
the Rural Electrification Administration project, like the Volta scheme, had provided 
electricity to rural areas and promoted industrialization. President Eisenhower proposed 
the project should begin with the small dam at Abouya, which already had been 
discussed. Nkrumah responded that the dam at Abuoya was feasible and equally 
economically beneficial in transforming the new nation towards its goal of 
modernizing. However, Nkrumah informed Eisenhower the site for the dam at Abuoya 
was not close to the bauxite deposits. Nkrumah told Eisenhower he hoped the United 
States support Ghana in its industrial development. Nkrumah anticipated American’s 
support to Ghana would follow the same path as the United States' support in the 
Philippines. The United States supported the Philippines in building the Filipino water 
supply system, which supplied sanitized water from its construction in 1946.43   
 The year 1960 ushered in new troubles that affected the Volta River Project. 
The Congo revolution against Belgian colonial rule, which Nkrumah supported 
discouraged many corporations from investing in any project in Africa. Shortly after 
Congo had gained its independence, an insurrection broke out which marked the 
emergence of the Congo crisis. Lumumba appealed to both the United States and the 
United Nations Organization to gain support to subdue Belgian colonial authority. 
However, both declined to offer support to Lumumba. Lumumba then turned to the 
Soviets for support and this created unrest in Congo since the United States, Belgium, 
President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, Congolese president, and chief of staff, Joseph-Desire 
Mobutu opposed Soviets support for Lumumba. Lumumba was imprisoned and 
murdered. Nkrumah supported the nationalist, Patrice Lumumba and criticized the 
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West’s support for the Belgians in the Congo crisis, thereby creating more problems. 
In July 1960, Ghana had become a republic, and that granted more power to Nkrumah 
as some restrictions on Nkrumah's presidential actions were removed. Nkrumah 
continued to attack the West for their involvement in the Congo crisis though he needed 
the United States support in developing the Volta scheme.44  
 Amidst the Congo crisis and Nkrumah’s bitterness against the West, Ghanaian-
American relations did not deteriorate. On August 7, 1960, Eisenhower sent a letter to 
Nkrumah, indicating the United States continued to have great interest in the project 
and believed it was time for negotiations to take place with the aluminum companies 
and the World Bank. In the absence of Mr. Douglas Dillon, the United States Under 
Secretary of State who had proposed cooperation with the International Bank for both 
reconstruction and reviewing of the project, Eisenhower appointed Mr. Edwin M. 
Martin, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to continue with 
the discussions on the project. Gbedemah, the finance minister who was continuously 
negotiating for the Volta River Project informed the United States representatives about 
Nkrumah's position towards the Soviets. The Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary for 
Political Affairs Raymond Hare, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department, 
Grady Upton, were to discuss the development of the project with the Ghanaian finance 
minister, Mr. Gbedemah in the following week. Eisenhower concluded in the letter that 
these state officials and the American government were pleased to cooperate with 
Gbedemah, and they would discuss plans towards developing the project with the intent 
of launching Ghana as an industrialized nation with a high level of energy power for 
industrial activities.45  
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 Gbedemah visited Washington, and after extensive negotiations, he returned to 
Ghana with an amount of £1.5 million, which was below the expected target needed in 
developing the project. Gbedemah feared Nkrumah might be angry and grant the project 
to the Soviets.46 However, on November 17, 1960, Gbedemah signed a contract with 
the Volta Aluminum Company after a lengthly negotiation with state officials. 
American support was needed for the success of the Volta River scheme. Nkrumah and 
his officials believed Ghana's transition to modernity and the desire to transform the 
young nation into an industrialized nation was dependent on support from one or the 
other of the superpowers. The Soviets were equally interested in supporting the project 
as they envisaged contributing towards Ghana's modernization while projecting their 
communist interests. Rumors of Soviets’ interest in supporting the project did not lure 
Nkrumah in, as he had faith in the United States to support the project. While this had 
been Nkrumah's position, he was ready to accept any offer from the Soviets in building 
a steel mill, about which United States companies were not interested, nor did they seek 
to compete with the Soviets.47  
 Americans became embittered when it came to the public that most of the 
Convention People’s Party (C.P.P.) ministers had been influenced by Tawia Adamafio 
and the C.P.P. ministers wanted the Volta project to be given to the Soviets. Adamafio, 
a member of the C.P.P, was the General Secretary of the C.P.P. In 1960, Nkrumah 
appointed him as the Minister of Information and Broadcasting and as a Minister for 
Presidential Affairs concurrently. His position as a presidential affairs minister made 
him influential in Nkrumah's government. Adamafio and John Tettegah, the leader of 
the Ghanaian Trade Union Council, visited the Soviet Union in 1960. Kruschev showed 
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his readiness to build the Volta project if the West delayed. The Soviets offered long-
term credit funds of 14.7 million Euros to Ghana. The Soviets' offer made Adamafio 
believe the East could assist the Volta development in a short time.48  
 Nkrumah announced during the National Assembly debate on January 1961 
that the Soviets had proposed to build the Bui Dam on the Black Volta. Clearly, 
Nkrumah’s intent was to gain support from both the East and West, with which he saw 
no problem, as he continued to proclaim his ideology of neutrality and positive non-
alignment.49 
 A new administration under the leadership of Kennedy was ushered into office 
in January 1961. Kennedy’s arrival on the scene transformed the Ghanaian American 
relations for the better. Kennedy came into office determined to usher in a new phase 
of United States foreign policy in Africa. Kennedy had a great interest in Africa even 
before his presidential campaign. During the Algerian war of revolution against France, 
Kennedy gave a speech detailing how Algeria must be freed from French imperialism. 
He had declared a fresh tolerance of neutralism. Kennedy's administration perceived 
American's aid to modernize Ghana as a test for the new dynamism of American policy 
towards Africa. Kennedy was determined to make the United States contribute to 
industrializing Ghana. He aimed at rectifying the damage he believed the Eisenhower 
administration had caused in Congo due to how Eisenhower handled the Congo crisis. 
Nkrumah had established a personal relationship with Kennedy even before Kennedy 
was voted into power as a president. Nkrumah had initially written to Senator Kennedy 
asking for support in the launch of Ghana towards industrialization. He wrote again 
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after the Democrat had won the election. Nkrumah declared that Africans had hope in 
the new administration.50  
  The murder of Lumumba on January 17, 1961 derailed Kennedy's vision. In 
Africa, it was confirmed the Central Intelligence Agency had spearheaded the murder 
of Lumumba. American C.I.A. supported Joseph Kasavubu and his subordinate, 
Colonel Joseph Mobutu, with weapons and this contributed to the overthrown of 
Lumumba.51 Lumumba's death worsened American relations in Africa. The Congo 
crisis commanded the most significant attention of President Kennedy. Kennedy 
worked along with the United Nations and Nkrumah and they established a 
constitutional government and established Congo as a nation. Once the Congo Crisis 
eased, Kennedy's attention shifted back to the Volta project. Nevertheless, Nkrumah 
was not happy about losing his close friend, Patrice Emery Lumumba. Kennedy's 
relations with Nkrumah made them put aside the Congo crisis and continue with the 
goal of modernizing Ghana through the Volta scheme.52 
 Kennedy was determined to win Africans over by supporting the Volta River 
Project. He anticipated that America's support for Ghana's Volta scheme would attract 
Africans to American policies. President Kennedy believed that one of the ways to gain 
the trust of the "Third World" was to establish personal relations with their leaders. He 
formed friendly relations with the likes of Sekou Toure, the Guinean president, and 
Kwame Nkrumah. Kennedy's relations with Nkrumah shaped Ghana's modernization 
goal for the next decade.53 Kennedy believed that moral diplomacy was a tool to 
enhance positive foreign relations. Barbara Ward, the wife of Sir Robert Jackson, was 
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the brain behind Kennedy's intent to support Ghana. Ward was a Carnegie Fellow at 
Harvard who had access to the Kennedy power base situated in Boston. Moreover, she 
had met Nkrumah as a friend, and her relations with the leader made her develop trust 
towards Nkrumah and encouraged Kennedy to sponsor the project. Kaiser also advised 
Kennedy's administration regarding the Cold War in Africa. Kaiser believed that the 
United States' support for the Volta River Project as a tool to launch the newly 
independent nation to industrialization would leave an indelible mark on the 
continent.54  
 On the other hand, Francis H. Russell, the American ambassador in Accra, 
offered up a discouraging report about perceptions of the United States in Ghana. He 
described an anti-American campaign carried on by the Ghanaian press and Ghana's 
shift towards the Soviets. Russell believed the United States' support for the Volta River 
Project would mean a reward for Ghana's anti-American attitude. Due to the Ghanaian 
press attacks, Russell believed America should not support Ghana in the modernization 
process. Moreover, Russell urged the United States not to underrate Nkrumah's anger 
over the Congo crisis. He added that Ghanaian conservatives had expressed hatred for 
Nkrumah. However, he cautioned that the United States' withdrawal from the Volta 
River Project would drive Ghana towards the Soviets' bloc. Russell believed Ghana's 
strong desire for modernization would push Nkrumah to the Soviets' side if America 
decided not to support the Volta project.55  
 The end of February 1961 witnessed significant events in Ghana. Chad 
Calhoun, Kaiser company’s vice president and Sir Robert Gillman Allen Jackson, a 
United Nations administrator made a trip to Ghana to discuss the Volta River Project 
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with Nkrumah. The Soviets’ penetration and involvement in Africa were heightened 
when Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev visited Ghana in early 1961 to discuss Eastern 
bloc policies toward Africa with Nkrumah. Brezhnev's visit and the banquet in his 
honor coincided with Calhoun and Jackson's visit to Ghana and their interview with 
Nkrumah. The banquet signaled Soviets' interest in contributing to Ghana's 
modernization. During the banquet, Nkrumah declared that Lumumba's death had made 
him understand how determined the West was in achieving its agenda in Africa.56  
 Brezhnev's visit to Ghana alarmed the West and prompted the United States to 
develop policies to subvert Soviets' penetration. Doing so required the United States to 
contribute towards launching Ghana to industrialization by supporting the Volta 
Project.57 Ward and Calhoun, in a memorandum to Kennedy, advised the president to 
win Nkrumah's heart from the Soviets when Nkrumah comes for his scheduled visit to 
Washington. Meanwhile, Nkrumah had explicitly stated that Africans no longer trusted 
the West because Africans believed the Western powers were bringing forth a new form 
of colonialism. Nkrumah cited the incident in Katanga in which the Belgian government 
and the Union Minière had supported Moise Tshombe, the Congolese politician. 
Nkrumah realized the West was determined to establish control over Africa. Such a 
perception from Nkrumah meant the United States was not going to take it easy in 
winning his heart. Nevertheless, Nkrumah believed there must be cooperation between 
the West and Africa. While he had expressed distrust in America, his vision for 
modernizing Ghana sustained his interactions with Kennedy.58 
 Americans became more concerned when Ghana entered into an economic 
agreement with Yugoslavia when Josip Broz Tito, president of the Socialist Federal 
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Republic of Yugoslavia, on March 1, 1961, visited Ghana. Gbedemah on the other 
hand, had been attacked by Adamafio's group and was at the point of clashing with 
Nkrumah. During his stay in Washington as he prepared for Nkrumah's visit, Gbedemah 
informed Walt Rostow, the American National Security adviser, of his fear of Ghana's 
shift towards the Soviets. He suggested Kennedy and Nkrumah alone should meet, 
barring Nkrumah's advisers from the meeting. Gbedemah thought due to Nkrumah's 
relations with Kennedy and the United States president's desire to contribute towards 
Ghanaian modernization, a discussion between the two presidents would be smooth 
compared to having discussions in the presence of other influencers of Nkrumah's 
government. Gbedemah believed Geoffrey Bing, Nkrumah's constitutional advisor, 
whom Russell had described as the most pro-communist among Nkrumah's advisers, 
would come along with Nkrumah in Washington. He alarmed Rostow by telling him of 
the growing influence of the Soviets in Ghana through Bing and the influential Russian 
ambassador, Aleksey Alekseievich Rodionov.59   
 In March 1961, President Nkrumah visited the United States en route to the 
United Nations General Assembly meeting. He met President Kennedy on March 8, 
1961, and the two presidents had a detailed discussion about the Volta River Project at 
the White House.60 Before their encounter, Barbara Ward sent a note to warn Kennedy 
that Nkrumah was temperamental and susceptible to changes in the Cold War era. Ward 
asserted that though Nkrumah had recognized the importance of the United States in 
transforming Ghana as an industrialized country, he would never compromise his non-
alignment position and neutrality for America's support for the project. Kennedy 
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listened to Ward's advice, and Nkrumah visited the White House in March without any 
of his ministers.61  
 Nkrumah did not hide his personality. He gave a blurred presentation of his 
opinions during his interaction with Kennedy. Kennedy shifted to Nkrumah's pro-
Soviet attitude and anti-western campaigns and how that had hindered the United States' 
financial support for the Volta River Project. Nkrumah responded that he was not a 
communist; instead, he noted, it was just easier to gain assistance from the East to 
industrialize Ghana compared to the West. Kennedy also believed it was easier for a 
“Third World” country to gain support from the East to industrialize than gaining 
assistant from the West, yet he wanted the Volta Project to be developed through 
American assistance. The relationship between the two leaders eased their discussions 
though each had reservations about the other's reaction. President Kennedy was ready 
to assist Nkrumah's Ghana to develop the project as an instrument for industrialization. 
Kennedy assured Nkrumah the amount of $30 million, which had been frozen under 
Eisenhower's administration, would be unfrozen. At the same time, all other hurdles 
would be resolved. Kennedy made a financial commitment to launch Ghana to the path 
of modernization without solely prioritizing America's economic interest.62  
 Kennedy extended his relationship with Nkrumah to include the first family. 
Upon ending the meeting, Kennedy went along with Nkrumah to meet the first lady and 
daughter, Caroline. Nkrumah was powerfully overwhelmed with the reception given to 
him and spoke enthusiastically about a new era of Afro-American relationships. The 
warm reception received signaled to the world America's commitment to helping the 
new nation to transform from a colonial society into a modernized nation. The meeting 
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of the two presidents brought hope in the development of the Volta River Project, yet 
there were some difficulties to overcome. The State Department and the Treasury 
thought the Kaiser company had been given preferential treatment, though they were 
inspired by Gbedemah's careful negotiations with the World Bank and the United 
States. Gbedemah feared the Soviets’ involvement in the project, yet he completed his 
negotiations in Washington. While all things seemed to be going well, Nkrumah caused 
another problem when he refused to accept the terms the World Bank laid down 
following advice from Lord Kaldor. Nkrumah's action reignited intense criticism and 
doubts. Here again, Ward took a firm stand and, in a famous memo, questioned: "Must 
we have two Aswans?" The United States feared they might as well lose the Volta 
scheme to the Soviets. Politically, the United States had hoped not to repeat another 
Aswan incident and grant the Soviets control over Ghana. On the other hand, 
Nkrumah's relations with Kennedy and the desire of both countries to achieve their aim 
calmed waters, which allowed the development of the project to begin. The Americans 
decided to use various means to connect with Nkrumah. Nkrumah continued 
negotiations concerning the development of the project with Kennedy.63 
 Kennedy sent a letter to Nkrumah on June 29, 1961.  He informed Nkrumah of 
how pleased he was since it seemed all the obstacles had been addressed. He believed 
the way have been cleared for the construction of the Volta scheme, which, when 
completed, would signal to the other African countries America's desire to willingly 
promote their national interest and modernize newly independent nations in Africa.64 
Nkrumah received Kennedy's letter before departing with sixty delegates for two-month 
tour of China, the Soviet Unions, and the Eastern bloc. During the tour, Nkrumah 
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openly flattered leaders of the communist bloc. Nkrumah's comment about the 
communists reignited more tension in Washington and created debates in Congress. 
Senator Albert Gore, chair of the Senate Committee on Africa, believed Nkrumah's 
policies favored the communist bloc. Kennedy questioned America’s intent to support 
the Volta scheme with a considerable amount of money since Ghana was neither 
proclaiming neutrality or liberalism. Congress remained unhappy with Nkrumah.65 
Kennedy sent Franklin Williams, a delegate who later became an American ambassador 
to Ghana, to study the situation in Ghana and provide a report. A group of three 
delegates under the leadership of Senator Gore followed up in October 1961. While 
Kennedy was ready to recognize Ghana's attempt to industrialize, circumstances in 
Ghana made him question America's support for the project.66    
 Kaiser, Chad Calhoun, and Ward, who had the opportunity to meet Nkrumah 
during Nkrumah's Eastern bloc tour, were optimistic the Volta project should continue. 
In October 1961, Senator Gore visited Ghana and had the opportunity to interview 
Nkrumah about the rumors concerning his movement towards the Eastern bloc. In 
response to the rumors, Nkrumah asserted the western press had misinterpreted his visit 
to the Eastern Bloc. He reported that his intent for the tour was to observe what the East 
had achieved. Nkrumah's response did not convince Gore, who concluded that Western 
colonialism continued to haunt the Ghanaian leader, and Soviet colonialism had blinded 
him. After meeting with Nkrumah, Gore advised Kennedy that the United States should 
put an end to supporting the project due to Nkrumah's pro-communist attitude and his 
attacks toward the West. For Gore, the Volta River Project was not economically 
beneficial for the United States and unlikely to benefit the VALCO group. Senator Gore 
  
65Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 572. 
66Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World, 163.  
  
 44 
  
believed funding the project would solely advance Ghana’s move to modernization 
while the political and economic interests of the United States would not be achieved.67 
 The C.I.A. also issued a negative report about Nkrumah and the project. It 
referenced Nkrumah's removal of moderate Ghanaian officials, the promotion of the 
more radical-minded Adamafio, together with his imprisonment of his critics. The 
report recommended that the United States pull out completely. The C.I.A. perceived 
Nkrumah as an egoistic and selfish leader who wanted to use the Eastern bloc to achieve 
his needs for industrializing while not committing entirely to communism. The C.I.A. 
anticipated Nkrumah's ambivalent attitude would increase, and he would eventually 
shift towards the communists. Moreover, the C.I.A. believed Nkrumah would also 
interfere in the affairs of other African countries and encourage their support for the 
Eastern Bloc continued suspicion of American and British motives. The C.I.A. believed 
funding the project would empower Nkrumah's Ghana to compete with world powers 
as an industrialized and modernized nation.68   
 Kennedy received a more astute and realistic report from Barbara Ward’s 
husband, Sir Robert Gillman Allen Jackson, a United Nations administrator, and an 
Australian naval officer who had specialized in logistic and technical assistance to the 
developing world. Jackson believed that during Nkrumah's trip to the East, Boateng and 
Adamafio had advised Nkrumah to eliminate all his expatriate colleagues such as Erica 
Powell, General Alexander, and Jackson himself. Jackson also affirmed that 
Adamafio's group limited access to Nkrumah, and no one with moderate leanings could 
get in touch with him. Adamafio's group sought to achieve a socialist economy by 
eliminating all forms of private enterprises.69 President Kennedy believed that 
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canceling America's support for the Volta scheme would affect policy goals towards 
Africa. In contrast, his support for Ghana would create a new opening for American aid 
to non-aligned nations in Africa. Kennedy hoped American aid to modernize and 
industrialize Ghana would ensure a more positive American presence in Ghana. At the 
same time, Nkrumah's non-alignment and positive neutrality philosophy would prevent 
him from leaning completely towards the Eastern bloc.70 
 After thoughtful deliberations, Kennedy decided to support the Volta River 
Project. Although Congress and most officials did not want America to support the 
project, Kennedy rejected their views. He declared support for the project as he intended 
to assist Nkrumah in industrializing Ghana. Kennedy believed the final beneficiaries of 
the project would be the people of Ghana and not Nkrumah's government, hence the 
urgency to launch Ghana towards modernization. When the National Security Council 
received news about Kennedy's decision, Kennedy declared, referring to his own 
brother's reservations about the project: "The Attorney General has not yet spoken, but 
I can feel the hot breath of his disapproval on the back of my neck." The opposition in 
the United States never changed Kennedy's mind. On January 22, 1962, Edgar Kaiser 
and Nkrumah signed an official agreement in Accra. Edgar Kaiser, the leader of the 
private firm, represented the United States in signing the contract. In total, America was 
to sponsor Ghana's modernization project with an amount of over $40 million.71  
 Nkrumah became the leader of the new Volta River Authority. He took full 
responsibility for the project. He anticipated using the Volta scheme to transform the 
new country through the United States and World Bank’s funds. The developers had 
hoped the Akosombo Dam would be launched by July 1964. The various parties 
  
70Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 573. 
71Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 573-4. 
  
 46 
  
planned for electricity to start flowing in September 1965, the same period when the 
loan repayments were also expected to start. The work began ahead of time on May 19, 
1964. Nkrumah officially announced the ceremony, which brought down the steel and 
concrete gates, closed the tunnel and began satiating the great Volta Lake. The lake was 
to cover an estimated one-ninth of Ghana, of which the Volta River Project was part of 
the social and economic benefits of the scheme. The plan was to provide maximum 
benefit to the Ghanaian population and government. These outputs together would help 
increase industrial activities through the production of electricity and would ensure 
industrialization and modernization.72  
 The death of President Kennedy introduced a new setback for America's 
support for the project. Kennedy, who had supported the idea of America financing the 
project, was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963. While Congress had not 
supported financing the project, Kennedy's relations with Nkrumah had been influential 
in shaping America's desire to launch Ghana towards modernization. According to 
William Mahoney, the American ambassador to Accra, the death of Kennedy 
diminished the eagerness of the American government to finance the Volta River 
Project. The removal of administrative support created new problems as new avenues 
were created for negotiations for the smelter. The great supporter of the project, 
Kennedy, was no more. Nevertheless, Nkrumah was determined to modernize Ghana 
and would do everything possible even if he had to shift towards the Soviets.73  
 The increasing intensity of Nkrumah's anti-American attitude presented another 
hurdle towards America's support for the Volta scheme. Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
had declared it was evident that Nkrumah and his government were behind the anti-
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American tension in Ghana. Rusk suggested America should review the aid towards 
the program due to Nkrumah's attitude. After discussions with Rusk, William H. 
Brubeck of the National Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, reviewed the development of the Volta scheme with Assistant 
Secretary of State Averell Harriman.74 During the conversation, Brubeck informed both 
Harriman and Rusk that Edgar Kaiser was to dine with him that evening, February 6, 
1964. Brubeck hoped then to discuss the project. Edgar Kaiser had become a close 
friend of Nkrumah, state department officials believed Kaiser could act as a liaison to 
connect the new administration with Nkrumah. The establishment of rapport with 
Nkrumah would enhance the United States' presence in Africa. It would as well help 
Nkrumah's ambition of promoting industrialization in Ghana through relations with 
America.75  
 The increasingly anti-American atmosphere in Ghana had made some 
Americans demand America's withdrawal from the Ghana project as a way of 
retaliating. Most Americans believed America's support for the Volta project would 
only benefit Ghana industrialization and modernization without promoting America's 
economic and political interest. Richard L. Philips, chief State Department press officer, 
incited the United States press to step up their roles against anti-American campaigns 
from Ghanaians. No one could answer why other foreign powers were not vehemently 
attacked, and the United States alone had to suffer in Accra. The American embassy 
protested to the Ghanaian government over the Ghanaian press' abusive statement that 
  
74Letter, Director of the Office of West African Affairs (Trimble) to the Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs (Williams), February 11, 1964, Africa, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter 
FRUS), 1964/68, vol. 24, eds. Nina Davis Howland and David S. Patterson, (Washington, DC: US Gov. 
Print. Off, 1999), doc. 237. 
75Memorandum for the Record on Discussions with the Secretary Rusk, February 12, 1964, FRUS, 1964-
1968, Africa, vol. 24, doc. 238. 
  
 48 
  
Americans had killed people in Korea, Panama, Cuba, and Congo. Americans 
demanded Congress use any means to punish Ghana.76  
 Politically, America's idea of pulling back would create a vacuum for 
communist influence in Ghana, which the United States hoped to prevent by supporting 
Nkrumah's desire to transform Ghana. The United States demanded that Nkrumah stop 
the press and Ghanaian politicians’ attacks. Harriman warned that there was the 
possibility of the United States government aborting the support for the project in either 
March or April if the situation in Ghana does not change. The United States 
recommended that the British prime minister should send a letter to warn Nkrumah 
about the consequences of his attitude for the development of the project. At the same 
time, Nkrumah was to ensure a cordial relationship with America based on the 
agreement he had with President Kennedy. Even after the death of Kennedy, Nkrumah's 
relations with Kennedy were used as a point of reference to strengthen Ghanaian-
American relations.77  
 Moreover, state officials had recommended that Edgar Kaiser, who had 
established personal relations with Nkrumah, should immediately visit Nkrumah. 
Kaiser was to emphasize the difficulties Nkrumah's words had presented to both the 
United States government and Kaiser. Besides, Nkrumah had to send a letter to 
Washington, indicating the favorable conditions in Ghana for the success of the project. 
Nkrumah, who was determined to transform his country, wanted to use every available 
means to gain America's full support in industrializing Ghana through the development 
of the Volta scheme.78 
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78Letter, Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson on the Volta Problem, February 13, 1964, FRUS, 
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 With the plan in possible jeopardy, Kaiser and Harriman visited Ghana to 
review the entire project again with Nkrumah. Kaiser continued to support the 
development of the project. However, some American critics asserted that the Kaiser 
Cooperation had made an excellent bargain, one from which the American government 
was not guaranteed a profit. Some Americans believed once the Ghanaian bauxite failed 
to be used, the new smelter would be forced to depend on bauxite that the Kaiser's ships 
imported. Some Americans believed that the Kaiser industry would benefit the most 
from the high profit. However, Kaiser Corporation proclaimed its intent to assist 
Nkrumah in modernizing Ghana. Although the Kaiser corporation had prioritized the 
maximization of profit, Kaiser's cordial relations with Nkrumah, together with his 
desire to support the newly independent nation in the transition towards 
industrialization, continued to influence Edgar Kaiser’s desire to support the 
development of the project. Nkrumah continued to search for capital investment as he 
wanted Ghana to run the smelter using its bauxite. Nkrumah's success would position 
Ghana in a better economic situation through Ghana's relations with the United States. 
Nkrumah, Harriman, Kaiser, and Jackson had a long series of meetings, after which 
they finally agreed that the smelter was to begin using Ghana's mined bauxite for its 
operation. Although Ghana's bauxite was to be used, the development of the smelter 
would be successful only with America's support through financing the development of 
the project.79  
 In June 1964, Nkrumah and Kaiser officially launched the smelter project. The 
two friends had maintained their relationships throughout the development of the 
project with the hope of modernizing Ghana. On an opening day, Kaiser gave a speech 
in which he emphasized hope, that a new colonial system would not be replaced with a 
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new tyrannical system. Instead, Ghana would promote its freedom and project its 
modernization through American support while maintaining neutrality.80 
 Despite the tense political situation in Ghana, the development of the smelter, 
Tema harbor, and Akosombo Dam continued. By September 1965, the entire scheme 
had been completed and the first electricity produced. President Nkrumah switched on 
the electricity which flowed into the 500-mile grid linking Akosombo with Accra, 
Kumasi, Takoradi, and the mining centers at both Tarkwa and Obuasi. The fact that 
electricity was produced indicated the entire project was complete. Hence, the 
development that took place after September 1965 was a preparation for the formal 
opening of the completed project.81  
 The official opening took place on January 22, 1966, following the arrival of 
President Nkrumah and his wife, Fathia Nkrumah. Earlier in the day, all movements 
shifted towards southern Ghana as people traveled to Akosombo. Taxis, private cars, 
cyclists, tro-tros (light buses), mammy lorries, coaches, and pedestrians held towards 
'Electri-City' the name given to Akosombo on that day. Nana Kwafo Akoto, the 
Omanhene of Akwamu, chaired the occasion as purification and libation took place as 
people called upon the ancestral spirits to bless the completed project. Two young steers 
were sacrificed to the gods along with an offering of libation with Ghanaian gin.82 
 Dr. Lodigiani, the director of Impregilo, was the first to speak at the event. He 
commented on the cooperation between public and private firms, which he believed 
created an opportunity for cooperation between private businesses and public 
businesses in Africa. He applauded Ghanaian workers for their efforts towards the 
creation of the project. Edgar Kaiser followed with his speech. Before delivering his 
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speech, Kaiser opened a telegram that his father had addressed to Nkrumah. His father 
expressed his regret for not making it for the occasion to partake in the great 
accomplishment. Kaiser's theme centered on the quality of faith and personal relations 
among statesmen and nations: 
             I am confident we are all aware that world conditions 
economically and politically-demand increasing cooperation and 
understanding among the world's nations. I believe deeply that 
men of different nations-representing different viewpoints and 
interests-can work together successfully. The requirement is a 
bond of mutual trust-mutual, respect, and mutual self-interest in 
accomplishing the specific task. These kinds of human bondage 
are the priceless ingredients that bring a sense of understanding, 
which we know can be achieved between peoples. Mr. President-
today, you are dedicating still another steppingstone in the 
direction of peace and understanding. And from steppingstones 
such as these, a watching world can experience a resurgence of 
faith. Faith never fails. It is a miracle worker. Our faith knows 
because it sees what we cannot see. It sees resources, powers, 
potencies, which our doubts and fears veil from us. Faith is 
assured, is never afraid, because it sees the way outsees the 
solution of its problem. It has dipped in the realms of our finer 
life-our higher and diviner kingdom. All things are possible to 
him who has faith-because faith sees-and recognizes the power 
that means accomplishment. It looks beyond all boundaries-
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transcends all limitations, penetrates all obstacles, and sees the 
goal.83 
He told Ghanaians how grateful the Kaiser Corporation was to help in building a better 
Ghana for both the current and future generations during his address to Ghanaians.84 
Kaiser confirmed the completion of the project had ushered Ghana into a bright new 
era with power that would grow and support a diversified economy. He continued that 
Nkrumah's hope of achieving a better life for Ghana through industrialization had been 
realized through the completion of the project.85  
  Nkrumah gave the main speech in the presence of Ghanaians, Americans, 
Italians, and other individuals gathered, who had participated in the development of the 
scheme. Nkrumah began by acknowledging the effort of all those who had played 
distinctive roles in making the development of the project a success. Nkrumah affirmed 
the goal of the project, which was to modernized Ghana, had been achieved through the 
willingness of the United States government, the World Bank, and other private 
institutions. He acknowledged the role of the Kaisers—father and son—who had 
committed wholeheartedly towards supporting the project. He specifically cited the role 
Edgar Kaiser played. Without his best friend, Edgar Kaiser, the Ghanaian leader 
stressed, the project would not have been successful. He also acknowledged the 
commitment of Calhoun, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. Nkrumah recalled an instance 
with Eisenhower when the president said simply, "Then why don't you get on with the 
damned thing?" Nkrumah also welcomed the Papal Nuncio and all other guests of the 
  
 83The State Publishing Corporation, “Inauguration of Volta Power: Address by Osagyefo the President 
and other speeches and messages delivered at the inauguration of the Volta River,” Saturday, January 
22, 1966, SPC/A10063/5, 000/1/66. Accra-Tema: Publicity Secretariat, 9-12. Accessed March 10, 2020. 
http://www.vra.com/kmportal/learning/nontech/Inauguration%20of%20Volta%20river%20Authority.p
df       
84The State Publishing Corporation, “Inauguration of Volta Power,” 9-12. 
85The State Publishing Corporation, “Inauguration of Volta Power,” 9-12.  
  
 53 
  
various nationals. He expressed a warm heart towards Kennedy and regretted Mrs. 
Jacqueline Kennedy was not present at the occasion. Mrs. Kennedy had wanted to honor 
the invitation to unveil the plaque in honor of the service both her husband, President 
Kennedy, and Eisenhower played in the project. Nevertheless, she could not attend the 
occasion, but wrote to Nkrumah and promised to visit Ghana shortly with her children.86  
 Nkrumah avoided his usual attacks on colonialism when he indicated a small 
and dynamic country like Ghana sought only to establish absolute control over its 
political, social, and economic institutions and envisaged transforming all forms of 
colonial legacies. After Nkrumah had delivered his speech, he opened the powerhouse 
plaque that signified the official inauguration of the Volta River Power Project. Per the 
special request of the widow of President Kennedy, Madam Fathia Nkrumah unveiled 
the second bronze plaque that signified the roles both Eisenhower and Kennedy played 
towards the development of the Volta scheme. The place was filled with darkness, then 
Nkrumah switched on the lights to showcase to attendees the amazing light. The event 
continued with celebrations and fireworks throughout the night. With all these done, 
the Volta River Project was completed.87 
The Volta River Project on Ghana's Economy and Industries 
 On a limited level, the Volta River Project contributed to the Ghanaian 
economy. In 1967, the first aluminum was exported, and later, aluminum began to 
contribute about 5 to 6 percent of Ghana's exports. Nonetheless, there were no 
significant changes in Ghana's export earnings. In total, the annual aluminum exports 
between the years 1968-1973 amounted to 46 million cedis. Conversely, the cost of 
imported alumina amounted to 23 million cedis. The total cost spent on imported 
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cryolite, pitch, coke, and other chemicals that were needed for aluminum production 
amounted to 9 million cedis per annum. Ghana's estimated maximum profit per annum 
amounted to 14,196,000 cedis per year, of which Ghana ran at a loss when the amount 
spent on imported machinery and other items were taken into consideration. The huge 
amount spent as expenditure on the production of aluminum did not allow Ghana to 
realize its profit expectation.88 
 While the project had been projected to reduce the unemployment rate, there 
was limited changes in the unemployment rate. The rate of unemployment in Ghana in 
the year 1970 stood the same as the rate in 1960; thus, 6 percent of the labor force was 
unemployed. It must be emphasized that the rate in Ghana was not comparable to the 
rate in many developed countries. Since the rate stood the same, it is unlikely the 
development of the Volta River Project played the expected contributing role in the 
employment situation in Ghana. A total of 2000 people were employed in the VALCO 
smelter, a sector which was not intended to be for a labor-intensive. Seven thousand 
(7000) people worked for the Volta River Project and Electricity Corporation of Ghana 
(E.C.G.). Hence, the workers who were directly employed were small, with most of 
them working on a casual basis.89 
 Due to the development of the Volta River Project, Ghana joined the aluminum 
production countries though in an unsatisfactory manner. Ghana exported bauxite and 
primary aluminum, while it imported alumina and rolled aluminum to be transformed 
into aluminum products. The continuous transportation of heavy materials did not 
benefit Ghana. The development of the project did not affect Ghana's trade-in useful 
resources. About 250,000 and 300,000 tons of alumina were imported each year to 
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satisfy the VALCO smelter. The Kaiser company produced the alumina from the 
bauxite it mined in Jamaica.90 
 The Volta River Authority's dam produced the most significant amount of 
electricity used in Ghana. The Electricity Company of Ghana (E.C.G.) supplied the 
other half of the Ghanaian population with electricity through the production of 
electricity from a diesel generating plant. The Volta River Authority sold some power 
to the Electricity Company of Ghana each year and the company distributed electric 
power to the Ghanaian public. The Volta River Authority also sold electricity to large 
companies such as VALCO, Communaute Electrique du Benin, Akosombo Textiles 
Limited, the Akosombo township, and other mining firms. Although the Volta River 
Authority produced a considerable amount of electricity each year, electricity had been 
a minor component in Ghana's energy supply. In 1969, the last year that had extensive 
data on energy supplies available, a total of 2,700 million kWh electricity was generated 
from both public and private sources. In the same year, a total of about 35,000 tons of 
imported coal was consumed. About 615,000 cubic meters of imported petroleum 
products were utilized as fuel. Since 1969, the electricity generated from the project 
had shot up by 50 percent; hence oil and hydroelectricity can be said to be comparable 
in necessity. Nonetheless, VALCO took a large percentage while the Ghanaian 
population used a small proportion.91 
What might have happened? 
 The development of the Volta project depended on both personal relations and 
economic interest together with national ideology. In an instance when American 
economic interest might have aborted the United States support for the Volta scheme, 
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personal relations among statesmen ensured the Volta project kept running. Nkrumah 
might have gained maximum support from the United States in the development of the 
project and easily industrialize Ghana. However, Lee Harvey Oswald's assassination of 
President Kennedy slowed down progress. Even when the Congo crisis had made the 
development of the project questionable, Kennedy continued to discuss the 
development of the project with Nkrumah. Moreover, despite the huge amount involved 
in the project, together with criticism from Congress and state department officials, 
Kennedy supported the new nation with the hope of industrializing Ghana while 
America was to use the aid to attract other African countries. Unfortunately, the death 
of Kennedy affected Nkrumah's ambition of industrializing Ghana within a space of 
time. The new administration under the leadership of Jackson did not invest heavily in 
the Volta scheme as Kennedy had done during his days. The new administration 
perceived the project to be too expensive. Jackson had less interest in Africa and shifted 
back and forth on American support for Ghana. While Edgar Kaiser had consistently 
supported the project, his efforts alone could not easily influence Congress and state 
officials.92 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the Volta River Project and how America 
contributed towards its development. The project began from the initial works of Sir 
Kitson, whom the British government appointed to study the existence of available 
minerals in the Gold Coast aside from gold. Of all the parties that were involved, the 
United States government and the Kaiser Corporation fully materialized their aims. The 
United States government primarily desired to gain political influence in the newly 
independent nation. At the same time, America also envisaged benefiting economically 
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from the Volta River Project.93 The United States also envisaged contributing towards 
modernizing the new nation. Relations among the leaders of the two countries shaped 
the relationship between Ghana and America. The Kaiser Corporation also had a share 
from the project and maximized its profits as a private company.94  
 Describing the project as a success when measured against the expectations of 
Nkrumah, Kaiser, and Kennedy is a subject for debate. The project did not provide 
Ghana with the healthy development that the Nkrumah government, President 
Kennedy, and the people of Ghana expected. However, the project contributed 
economically to the Ghanaian economy. Even if one defines the idea of development 
by industrialization, the success of the project was open to questions. If we are to limit 
ourselves merely to monetary gains, the success of the scheme is open to criticism. 
Moreover, when one defines the development of the project in line with the political 
autonomy of the new country, the project becomes awkward and too complicated for 
description.95  
 If Nkrumah were alive today, he would have been extremely disappointed. 
Today, the provision of electricity in Ghana remains unstable. Over the years, Ghana 
experienced a continuous power shortage popularly known as dumsor. The irrigation 
and lake transport part of the project seems not to provide the expected profit the 
partners had anticipated. 
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Into the World We Go, The Peace Corps Program as A 
Facet of America-Ghana Relations. 
 
 "Certainly, I owe this gift to the boy Peace Corps Larry Grobel, 
who helped me to discover an attribute that would later give me my 
livelihood from 1982 after I had lost my job at the Ghana News 
Agency as an editor. May God bless the boy wherever he may be 
and all those who fostered the Peace Corps concept. Without their 
vision, I would be selling chains in the streets in Accra."1 
  
 After Ghana had attained its independence in 1957, Nkrumah's most significant 
domestic challenge became the transformation of the Ghanaian educational system. He 
believed in restructuring education as a tool for modernizing his newly independent 
country. Since Ghana spent many years under colonial rule, the country had a five 
percent literacy rate in 1957 when Ghana attained its independence. The colonial 
government had given little attention to the Ghanaian educational system.2 Upon 
assuming power, Nkrumah developed a five-year plan which sought to ensure self-
sufficiency in Ghana through universal education, a basic requirement for a modernized 
nation.3 Ghanaian leaders sought to revise the educational system to remove incorrect 
information spread under colonialism as they sought to achieve modernization.4     
 Nkrumah envisaged making elementary education free to allow all Ghanaians 
to have access since mass education was seen as the primary tool for modernization. 
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Built on the British system of education, Ghana's pre-tertiary system of education 
consisted of primary and secondary school.5 Ironically, Nkrumah's program for self-
sufficiency and independence required dependence on other postcolonial powers—
creating outside relationships, especially with the Americans, whom Nkrumah did not 
particularly trust. However, the Ghanaian leader was willing to bend his ideals. The 
United States' establishment of the Peace Corps program coincided with Ghana's need 
for more teachers following Nkrumah's declaration of free universal primary education 
in 1961.6  
 Nkrumah frequently expressed his reservations about American foreign policy, 
especially in Africa, despite his hope that America could assist in Ghana's aim of 
achieving modernization. Aware of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) and how 
it operated in fighting against some "Third World" leaders, Nkrumah became skeptical 
because he suspected the Peace Corps volunteers were C.I.A. agents.7 Suspicion was 
mutual. Even in Washington, Nkrumah had been identified as a communist associate. 
A New York Times editorial on July 16, 1961 published Senator Thomas Dodd's 
statement characterizing Ghana as the "First Soviet Satellite in Africa."8 Despite 
Nkrumah's suspicion about the Peace Corps program, he later accepted it, advising 
Ghanaians to embrace the program, and requested volunteer teachers by the 
commencement of the school term in September 1961. Nkrumah's desire to modernize 
Ghana sustained his relations with America despite his skepticism about the United 
States.9  
  
 5Amin, “The Perils of Missionary Diplomacy,” 40. 
6Amin, “The Perils of Missionary Diplomacy,” 40. 
 7Ofori E. Bekoe, “The United State Peace Corps as a Facet of United States- Ghana Relations,” The 
Journal of Pan African Studies 4, no. 10 (January 2012): 231. 
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 Along the line, the Peace Corps program and its volunteer teachers faced a rigid 
teaching environment because of the structure of the Ghanaian "fidelity approach" in 
implementing the curriculum, which was new to American teachers. Before 
independence, Ghana stuck to the fidelity approach of curriculum implementation. 
Modeled on the British Education System, this centralized curriculum gave teachers 
minimal room for changes. Volunteer teachers were required to strictly comply with 
how the government structured the syllabus. Volunteers had envisioned upgrading the 
Ghanaian education system to make the syllabus match the needs and interests of both 
learners and Ghanaian officials by restructuring the content and pedagogy. Since some 
headmasters resisted innovations, tension between volunteers and headmasters 
resulted.10  
 Despite challenges the program faced, the development of the project became 
successful through personal relationships between Nkrumah and John F Kennedy rather 
than relationships driven solely by ideology or necessarily economics. President 
Kennedy was committed to supporting Ghana in modernizing its educational system 
despite Congress' criticisms of Nkrumah's ideology as a communist. The American 
ideal of helping all people to achieve a better life informed choice in Washington. On 
the other hand, the Ghanaian culture of hospitality and the willingness to cooperate 
while working to improve their social, political, and economic system made American-
Ghanaian relations smooth. 
 The United States Peace Corps program contributed immensely to modernizing 
Ghana's education system despite the suspicion that surrounded America-Ghana 
foreign policy. This chapter examines the contributions of the United States in 
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developing the Ghanaian education system. The chapter will also discuss the challenges 
the United States and its volunteers faced in their support towards transforming the 
Ghanaian education system as a tool towards modernizing the new nation. It provides 
an understanding of the contributions of the Peace Corps program and Cornell 
University’s educational roles as a facet of United States-Ghana relations in building 
up the newly independent nation through the development of Ghana's education. 
Colonial System of Education in Ghana 
 Unlike other regions in Africa where missionaries established the first 
European form of schools, sizable European trading companies established the first 
Western form of schools that existed in Ghana. Before 1951, Ghana had achieved a 
minimum level of internal self-government, but Britain controlled the educational 
system of the country. Schools were not evenly distributed within the nation since the 
educational system was at the minimum level, with about 3,000 schools catering for 
about 312,000 pupils.11 Although educational activities expanded from the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the general policies that guided educational development 
remained static.12 From 1940, the educational sector experienced rapid growth. The 
demand for primary education in the southern region of Ghana led to the establishment 
of many primary schools in the South by the local communities, which lacked 
government funding as well as equipment. Local communities established these 
primary schools, most of which lacked equipment. Besides, these schools had untrained 
teachers as staff.13 By 1945, the number of unaided schools had increased to 2,000 with 
an enrollment of about 105,000 pupils outnumbering the government's assisted schools 
and pupils in the government's assisted schools. The Educational Department's reports 
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in 1951 and 1952 indicated the Colony and Ashanti areas had high numbers in terms of 
the number of schools and pupils enrolled in the primary, middle, secondary, teacher 
training, and technical schools compared to the Northern Territories.14  
 The colonial education curriculum in Ghana sought to satisfy the European 
administrators who wanted to train personnel for their economic and administrative 
gains. The colonial educational system was not structured to benefit Ghanaians. The 
Colonial authority prioritized its interest against Ghanaian interests as it implemented 
an educational system meant to indoctrinate Ghanaians against modernizing Ghana. 
During the colonial days, formal education segregated boys and girls and minimized 
the idea of universal education. Girls were family keepers and mainly focused on family 
and home care related subjects, while boys were prepared to take up white collar jobs. 
Also, the "fidelity form of curriculum," instituted during the colonial days hindered 
educational innovations and modernization. Teachers were limited to the colonial 
government curriculum without modification. Teaching and learning in Ghana did not 
cater for the needs, interests, and aspirations of Ghana and Ghanaians. The colonial 
authorities prohibited the teaching of content that supported Ghanaian interests, 
nationalism, and modernization. 15  
Educational System in the Days of Nkrumah 
 From 1951, the achievement of internal self-governance in Ghana led to the 
emergence of a new African government in the British colony. The new government 
increased the number of Ghanaians in the legislative and executive council. The new 
government, under the leadership of Nkrumah, considered education as its greatest 
domestic challenge.16 Nkrumah moved to upend the colonial system of education; he 
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insisted that every individual must be entitled to an education that would jointly bring 
holistic changes to the nation. Nkrumah envisioned Africanizing and removing colonial 
practices and expanding the educational system to all regions to allow all Ghanaians of 
school-going age to be enrolled.17  
             President Nkrumah admired the American educational system; he earned both 
his bachelors and master’s degrees in that system. As a nationalist leader and an 
individual interested in continental leadership and nationalist activities, he preferred the 
American to the British system as an academic model. He believed the United States' 
educational system developed people holistically to promote national interest. Nkrumah 
felt the problem of subsistence could be made more manageable, and both the rich and 
poor could have access to education. Moreover, the United States had rebelled against 
Britain in the 1770s and established a quality educational system that he envisaged 
Ghana could model. Moreover, great Africans, such as Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, 
who had arisen as great nationalists, had also gone through the American educational 
system.18 Despite his reservations, the American system maintained a strong allure for 
the Ghanaian leader.  
               Nkrumah's educational aim for Ghana began to manifest during his days at the 
University of Pennsylvania in the 1930s. He believed every educational system should 
be tailored to match the life of the people. This vision became his long-term educational 
policy to shape the newly independent country between 1957-1966 as he sought to 
modernize the new country.19 For Nkrumah, the Ghanaian education system should 
mold Ghanaians and create the highest and most beneficial relationship with Ghanaian 
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culture. He wanted to modernize the Ghanaian education system and provide universal 
education to all Ghanaians by making education accessible and free for all school-going 
children. The objective of making education accessible to all prompted Nkrumah to 
implement the 1961 Act (Act 87) to ensure free universal primary education in Ghana. 
He asserted that circumstances in Ghana had made the mere acquisition of knowledge 
not valuable in contributing to Ghana's development. Instead, the application of the 
knowledge to obtain practical and positive outputs for the benefit of the nation made 
knowledge more valuable both for the individual and for the nation. Nkrumah exalted 
the role of science as he prioritized the acquisition and application of knowledge for the 
benefit of all. Nkrumah envisaged developing the educational system that would 
nurture Ghanaians to impact society and their lives. Nkrumah believed the development 
of university education was important not only in producing engineers, architects, town 
planners, and builders, but it also played a pivotal role in contributing to the 
development of Ghana. Nkrumah's ideal was one of empowering and developing 
Ghanaians, and all Africans, with the needed skills and necessary information to 
manage their affairs. Nkrumah believed education was the foundation for the creation 
of Pan-Africanism.20 
 During the 1954 Legislative Assembly election campaign, Nkrumah promised 
Ghanaians that he would expand educational opportunities and school facilities in 
Ghana. Nkrumah envisioned change and development in Ghana. He believed that 
education could be the primary means to achieve that goal.21 The education sector had 
a role to play in making Ghana accomplish self-sufficiency despite the significant 
challenges facing the educational system in the new country.22 Nkrumah desired an 
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educational system that would produce scientifically literate people in Ghana, increase 
productivity rate, and provide knowledge to enhance improvement in the Ghanaian 
economy.23 In August 1951, the new government under Nkrumah implemented the 
Accelerated Development Plan. The Accelerated Development Plan sought to ensure 
rapid expansion of the public education system to provide education for all school-
going children in Ghana.24 Unlike the colonial system of education, the Accelerated 
Development Plan made it possible for the government to sponsor all schools that won 
its approval.25 On July 4, 1961, Nkrumah declared to Parliament that universal 
education would be the sole means to ensure the development of the latent abilities and 
intelligence of Ghanaians.26  
 The major challenge that hindered Nkrumah's vision proved to be the lack of 
qualified teachers to execute the teaching project. The number of schools and pupils 
that existed in the Ghanaian education system outnumbered the number of trained 
teachers in Ghana. The Ministry of Education turned to the Peace Corps program, 
together with the recruitment from overseas, to provide enough graduates to promote 
the expansion of education. There remained grave doubts, however, about recruiting 
foreigners to teach Ghanaian children.27 
Overview of the Peace Corps Project 
  The Peace Corps Project began during John Fitzgerald Kennedy's campaign as 
an American presidential candidate on October 14, 1960. He addressed a group of 
10,000 students and asked how many Americans were willing to spend some years in 
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developing countries to work for America as doctors, engineers, or technicians.28 This 
speech inspired the students who took a step in organizing the "American Committed 
to World Responsibility" drive and petitioned for the establishment of a program in 
which students could assist people in developing countries.29                    
              On January 21, 1961, Kennedy appointed Robert Sargent Shriver Jr, former 
president of the Chicago Board of Education and his brother-in-law, as the head of the 
task force. Shriver's initial task centered on studying the possibility of the Peace Corps 
project.30 Upon studying the feasibility of a voluntary overseas project and making 
positive recommendations, Kennedy issued an Executive Order #10924 on March 1, 
1961, to establish the Peace Corps.31 The president appointed Shriver as the first 
director three days after the executive order.32 Distinctively, the Peace Corps program 
sought to provide a maximum trained workforce to contribute towards the 
developmental needs of developing countries. The other programs the United States 
had organized before the Peace Corps program provided military aid, capital assistance, 
and technical assistance to other nations.33 The United States Congress defined three 
essential goals of the Peace Corps program. First, the program would help the people 
of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for a trained workforce. Second, 
the Peace Corps would provide a better understanding of Americans on the part of the 
peoples served. Third, the Corps would promote a better understanding of other peoples 
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on the part of Americans.34  Volunteers were to assist in raising the standards of living 
and improving the educational systems of developing countries.35  
 Over the years, there has been a debate as to whether Kennedy had a moral 
justification for the institutionalization of the Peace Corps or whether the program was 
designed as a tool of American Cold War policy. Some scholars have described the 
program as an ideological tool meant to preach about the American idea of democracy, 
liberty, and equality to developing countries at the height of the Cold War. Kennedy 
said during his inaugural speech that America intended to support people in misery, 
those in the "Third World." Some scholars think the Peace Corps was an instrument for 
supporting and spreading American interests and ideology during the Cold War, hence 
America's intervention in the "Third World." Indeed, the program was to counter the 
spread of Soviets communism by showing American friendship towards developing 
countries. At the same time, the program assisted "Third World" countries in 
developing their education and economic systems.36 Other people believe the Peace 
Corps program sought to promote the Central Intelligence Agency’s vision of providing 
tactical and strategic importance for America.37 These issues bothered Nkrumah. 
Nonetheless, Nkrumah's continuous relations with Kennedy helped in developing trust 
to ensure acceptance of the Peace Corps program. Nkrumah believed Kennedy 
genuinely wanted to assist in transforming Africa. The Peace Corps program 
contributed immensely to transforming the Ghanaian education system despite the 
skepticism Ghanaian officials expressed. 
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The Peace Corps in Ghana 
 Ghana became the first country to receive the first group of Peace Corps 
volunteers. Before his appointment to run the agency, Shriver had toured Ghana and 
other countries in Africa.38 Ghana's significance as the first Sub-Saharan African 
country to gain its independence on March 6, 1957, made Shriver choose Ghana as the 
first site for the Peace Corps program. Moreover, Nkrumah had been a popular figure 
in the anti-colonial movement in Africa. Besides, Nkrumah, who had studied in the 
United States and served as a teacher, prioritized the educational goals of the new 
country. Nkrumah regarded the Peace Corps as a means to build the Ghanaian 
educational system, which needed more teachers.39 Nkrumah believed universal 
education served as the means to develop the ability and intelligence of Ghanaians as 
he moved to transform Ghana into a developed, modern country. Kennedy and 
Nkrumah's relations played a role in Shriver's choice. Kennedy envisaged supporting 
the vision of his close friend, Nkrumah. Moreover, Nkrumah and Kennedy built trust, 
and that made the corps program welcome in Ghana. Even if other "Third World" 
leaders would reject the peace corps volunteers, Nkrumah, Kennedy's friend, would be 
the testing tool and accept the peace corps volunteers into Ghana. These motivational 
factors inspired Shriver in his choice of Ghana as the first beneficiary of the Peace 
Corps initiative.40  
 On August 30, 1961, the first Peace Corps volunteers from America stepped 
down from a plane in Accra. Ghanaians welcomed the Peace Corps volunteers. 
Kennedy remained optimistic and believed Nkrumah would welcome the volunteers. 
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The first fifty volunteers came attired in summer suits and light cotton dresses when 
they first touch the land of Ghana.41  The Peace Corps volunteers began to sing the 
Ghanaian new national anthem "Yen Ara Asaasa Ni" (This Is Our Homeland) in Twi. 
The group studied Twi, the Akan dominant local language, before coming to Ghana. 
The ability of the volunteers to sing in the local dialect of the Ghanaians signified to 
the world and the Ghanaian population the friendship and understanding at the core of 
the Peace Corps' mission to serve Ghana.42 Kenneth Baer presented a speech in Twi 
after the volunteers finished singing. He indicated the Peace Corps volunteers had come 
to both learn and teach. Tom Livingston from Woodale, Illinois, became the first 
volunteer to take up a position as an English teacher at Dodowa Secondary School in 
Ghana on September 12, 1961. Afterward, other volunteers began to work as teachers.43 
Contributions of the Peace Corps Program Towards Ghana's Education  
 Before the arrival of the Peace Corps volunteers, Ghanaians believed the 
volunteers would contribute to the development of Ghana's education as a step towards 
modernization.44 Given Nkrumah's apparent skepticism of the corps, the very fact that 
he did not deport the volunteers, suggests its success in Ghana in transforming the 
newly independent nation. Kennedy's connection with Nkrumah allowed Ghana to 
receive more volunteers over time.45 Moreover, the fact that the United States later 
expanded the Peace Corps program in Africa and invested more money suggests that 
the results of the program satisfied the United States.46 
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 Education has always been the Peace Corps' major contribution to modernizing 
Ghana. Although Nkrumah understood universal education as the mark of a modernized 
nation, he recognized such a vision could materialize only through support from a 
superpower like the United States. Nkrumah built a strong relationship with Kennedy 
as a measure to attain Ghana's educational needs. The Peace Corps contributed to 
Nkrumah's ambition of ensuring free education for all desiring Ghanaians up to the 
secondary level. The program saved the Ghanaian Ministry of Education from huge 
expenditures. The Ghanaian government would have spent huge sums on teachers' 
salaries, development costs, and indirect expenses. An examination of the number of 
volunteer teachers by 1966 brings to light the amount the country saved. Ghana was 
relieved of the amount spent on training teachers, paying teachers' salaries, and 
developing institutions. Moreover, the Peace Corps program mitigated against the 
indirect costs that would have drained a considerable percentage of Ghana's budget. 
Training one teacher for five years costs about $15,000. With the first batch of volunteer 
teachers sent in 1961, the Ministry of Education was relieved of the stress of training 
and employing more Ghanaian teachers. The ministry's need for more teachers would 
have burdened the country's limited resources. Moreover, there were a limited number 
of trained teachers in Ghana to enhance the expansion of the Ghanaian education 
system. Kennedy planned to help Nkrumah materialized. American support through the 
provision of teachers released Ghana from financial burden. At the same time, the 
available resources were channeled towards various other sectors in the transformation 
of the country.47  
 The expansion of the educational system in Ghana became successful through 
the Peace Corps. Kennedy contributed towards the expansion of the Ghanaian 
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educational system as Nkrumah, his friend had envisioned. Without the corps, only the 
major cities would have enjoyed universal education. The rural regions would have 
continued to suffer. While Ghanaian teachers had avoided posting to the "bush" schools 
since the rural areas lacked amenities, the volunteer teachers welcomed working in the 
rural centers and newly established schools. Volunteer teachers preferred teaching in 
rural and newly established schools compared to the urban centers. The volunteers felt 
the rural schools and newly established schools needed their service. Through support 
from American volunteers, each region of Ghana tasted an expansion of the free 
education system. Teachers handled classes in both the rural and urban centers. Also, 
the introduction of the Peace Corps program increased the number of graduates from 
the teacher training colleges. Volunteer teachers occupied positions in teacher training 
colleges, which allowed for an increase in the teacher training college enrollment. With 
enrollment increased, the graduation rate also increased over the years. These graduates 
contributed towards the national interests and goal of modernization.48 
 Peace Corps volunteers served as math and science teachers in the various 
institutions in Ghana: universities, teacher education programs, and secondary schools. 
In the secondary schools, the success of Ghanaian science teaching depended on the 
Peace Corps volunteer teachers. Over the years, the Ghanaian Ministry of Education 
assigned teachers to teach in the various secondary schools and teacher training 
colleges. Some also taught in Ghana's three major universities in the biological and 
physical sciences.49 The Peace Corps program became the means to produce white-
collar workers. Ghanaians who achieved white-collar status between 1961-66 
invariably had, at one point in time, encountered a Peace Corps teacher.50 Former 
  
48Boyle, Blohm, and Helfer, Peace Corps/Ghana Country Program Evaluation, 26-28. 
49Boyle, Blohm, and Helfer, Peace Corps/Ghana Country Program Evaluation, 12.  
50Hoffman, All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s, 179-180. 
  
 72 
  
students of the Peace Corps program testified to the impact they received from the 
volunteer teachers. For example, Ansah Barnor, a former student of the Peace Corps 
program, appreciated how the program shaped his professional life. Barnor believed the 
program moved him from a life on the streets to the middle class. He believed the 
program placed him in a white-collar job. In the absence of the Peace Corps, the 
unemployment rate in Ghana would have increased vehemently. Ghanaian American 
relations provided Ghanaians with the prerequisites needed to function in various 
workplaces. Kennedy, Nkrumah's close friend, contributed to assist the expansion of 
the Ghanaian education through instituting the Peace Corps program.51   
 The Peace Corps program also played a role in increasing enrollment in schools 
and raised the number of new schools between 1960 and 1965. Primary school 
enrollment rose from 444,117 to 1,137,495. Moreover, secondary schools had increased 
from 59 to 105 between 1960 to 1965, with enrollment jumping from 16,577 to 
42,111.52 In 1957, Ghana's enrollment stood at 571,580 pupils in both primary and 
middle schools. By 1963-64, the number increased to over 1.3 million. There were 38 
secondary schools with 9,860 pupils in 1957, and this figure shot to 89 schools with an 
enrollment of 32,000 in 1963-64. Teacher-training institutions also increased more than 
four times from 1957 to 1963-64.53 Peace Corps volunteers contributed immensely 
towards this expansion. Volunteers taught at various educational levels. The 
coordination between the two countries played a significant role in making the program 
successful, hence the increment in enrollment. Moreover, the relations between 
President Kennedy and Nkrumah shaped the program amidst some challenges. 
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 Eighty-five percent of the volunteers taught in the Ghanaian educational cycle 
and prepared students for the General Certificate of Examination Level. Most of the 
teachers taught chemistry, physics, zoology, and general science to prepare students for 
their final exams.54 For instance, Lee Carlson, as a volunteer, taught engineering at the 
Accra technical institute. Also, Donald Graff, a network volunteer, taught physics and 
chemistry to prepare students for their final examination.55 American relations with 
Ghana contributed to the development of science education in the new country. Every 
part of Ghana felt the volunteers' impact, which brought a significant transformation. 
Regions that had been behind in terms of educational development felt the presence of 
the volunteers. 
 Most of the volunteers also engaged in secondary activities such as organizing 
drama and clubs, building athletic teams, organizing sporting activities, serving as role 
models to Ghanaians, and providing an enthusiastic spirit for Ghanaians.56 Volunteer 
teachers engaged in institutional development in some rural and newly established 
schools. They assisted headmasters to construct science labs and libraries and provided 
materials.57 These volunteers contributed to increasing Ghanaian citizens' level of 
numeracy and creativity. Peace Corps volunteers served in other capacities besides 
education, with twenty-five (25) volunteer geologists sent to help in the development 
of Ghana's mineral reserves.58  
 The Peace Corps program also contributed towards restructuring the Ghanaian 
system of education by introducing new math and learning styles that emphasized 
reasoning and problem solving over rote learning. Some of the volunteers created an 
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enhanced mathematics syllabus to improve the teaching of mathematics in Ghanaian 
schools.59 With the growth of the Peace Corps project, community development 
became the other agenda aside from teaching. Volunteers contributed to the building 
of community libraries, sports centers, water projects, and others.60 
  The Ghanaian National Service Scheme in Ghana emerged from the Peace 
Corps project. Some years after the introduction of the Peace Corps, Ghana began a 
mandatory version of youth service meant to address the educational, technological, 
and agricultural needs of the nation modeled on the Peace Corps program. The fact 
that Ghanaians sought to replicate the Peace Corps in their national volunteer 
organization presents a strong affirmation of the American endeavor.61 However, the 
Peace Corps’ story had its challenges that the program encountered overtime. 
Peace Corps Challenges 
 Even before the commencement of the Peace Corps Program, challenges had 
begun unfolding in the United States. The civil rights movement hit its peak in the 
1960s and America's racism and foreign policy overshadowed volunteer training from 
the start.  
 In Africa, the Peace Corps program's reputation became controversial due to 
the scandalous behavior of Margery Michelmore Heffron in Nigeria.62 Heffron, having 
graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Smith College, joined the first 
batch of the Peace Corps program. Although she did not resemble an individual who 
could set off an international incident, she created a scene on October 14, 1961, that 
threatened the success of the Peace Corps program in Africa. During her training at the 
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University of Ibadan, Nigeria, Michelmore sent a postcard to her boyfriend that derided 
Nigeria's "Squalor and primitive living conditions." Before the postcard was mailed, a 
Nigerian student who was offended by the description of the country got hold of the 
letter and distributed copies to all over the campus. This led to mass riots, and 
Nigerians, who perceived their country to be better than "primitive" as described in the 
content of the letter, gathered to torment Michelmore. The press picked up the issue 
and published it on the front page of the newspapers. The tension that arose forced 
Michelmore to flee Nigeria to Washington, D.C.63 The uproar over Michelmore reached 
Ghana in short order. Peace Corp volunteers worried it would upend the carefully laid 
plans of both Americans and Ghanaians. Volunteers believed the Peace Corps program 
would close as Nigerians would sack volunteers. Ghanaians would follow suit by 
throwing out the Peace Corps officials.64 Instead of apologizing to Nigeria, United 
States officials justified the racist comments of Michelmore. Moreover, one would have 
expected Kennedy to apologize to Africans for the racist comments. Rather, President 
Kennedy sent a personal letter expressing his deepest sympathy to the "poor girl;" the 
president, in turn, faced American anti-racists demonstrations for defending 
perpetrators of racism.65 
 While the volunteers envisaged a transformation of the Ghanaian education 
system through their service, they were not necessarily up to the challenge. Most of the 
Peace Corps volunteers were not qualified to teach. In its official request of American 
teachers, the Ghanaian Ministry of Education asked that only those personnel with a 
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master's degree from an American institution could qualify as teachers for Ghanaian 
secondary schools. The Ministry of Education considered the American master's degree 
to be equivalent to the British bachelor's degree. However, the massive demand for 
teachers to match the increased enrollment in education facilities eliminated the 
qualification demand.66 Out of the numerous volunteers, most were not educators nor 
specialists who had majored in the area of specialization they were assigned to teach. 
Only sixteen volunteers out of the entire group dispatched to Ghana in 1961 had 
teaching experience.67 The experienced teachers were sent to first-class secondary 
schools since the government of Ghana wanted to maintain a higher standard for the 
best students in the bid to modernize the new country.68 For most of the volunteer 
teachers, their first year of teaching in the various schools was trial-and-error 
experiences. Nonetheless, since the standard of the Ghanaian secondary school system 
was below that of the United States, the volunteers were better qualified than the local 
teachers despite not being education majors.69 Still, volunteer teachers who taught 
courses in which they had little training during college became vulnerable. Many also 
performed numerous teaching and co-curricular activities that made it difficult for them 
to adequately prepare for class. For instance, Peace Corps volunteer Howard Ballwanz, 
taught English, history, geography, and religion at Swedru Secondary School while 
doubling as the dormitory supervisor.70 
 The Ghanaian political environment also created a fierce challenge for Peace 
Corps volunteers. The Peace Corps suffered from editorial comments from Ghanaian 
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newspapers, which often described the program as a new form of imperialism.71 
Nkrumah also began to chastise the volunteers. He had initially called for the service 
of the Peace Corps volunteers with the hope of restructuring the Ghanaian education 
system. Nevertheless, Nkrumah posed perhaps the greatest challenge to the program 
from 1963. His skepticism about the Peace Corps program never fully subsided. The 
demise of Kennedy, Nkrumah's close friend, might have altered Nkrumah's perception 
of the Peace Corps program. After an attempted coup to overthrown Nkrumah failed 
on January 22, 1964, he began to implement steps to counter the volunteers' influence. 
He believed the C.I.A. and the Peace Corps volunteers had joined to mastermind the 
attempted coup d' état. Nkrumah banned Peace Corps volunteers from the teaching of 
English and history because he believed the volunteers would use such courses to 
indoctrinate students against his government.72  According to George Ayi-Bonte, the 
Associate Director of the Peace Corps program in Ghana, American volunteers had 
used George Orwell's Animal Farm in their English classes to shed light on the 
Ghanaian system of government. Nkrumah became furious, for he believed students 
might later rebel against his government. This Orwellian restriction never extended to 
Canadian and Soviets volunteers. 73 
   In 1963, Nkrumah went a step further to invite some young volunteers from 
Russia. Furthermore, Nkrumah allowed other Western volunteers into Ghana, and that 
brought competition between American volunteers and European volunteers. 
Nkrumah might have lost trust in solely depending on America's support to transform 
Ghana. One American volunteer reported Nkrumah wanted to neutralize the Peace 
Corps teachers. On the other hand, he wanted to limit the influence of the American 
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teachers as well despite believing the United States had much to contribute towards 
Ghana's modernization. Nkrumah's invitation to the Russians created tension and 
competition between the two blocs. Both Americans and Russians were striving for 
influence in Ghana.74 On the part of Nkrumah, he saw nothing wrong with the 
invitation of Russian teachers since he desired to use every possible means to 
modernize the newly independent country through support from the superpowers. 
Cornell-Ghana Project: Facet of Ghana-U.S. Relations in Education 
 Beyond state-to-state ties such as those between the Ghanaian government and 
the U.S. Peace Corps, other private organizations from the United States also 
contributed towards the development of the Ghanaian education system. The creation 
of home economics and agriculture studies as part of the Ghanaian school curriculum 
can be attributed to Ghana's relations in the early 1960s with USAID and with the U.S. 
land grant college system. These interactions between Ghana and the United States 
ushered in Cornell University's contributions to restructuring the education system as a 
mark of launching Ghana towards modernization.75  
 From 1961, Cornell university assisted in building the Ghanaian education 
system through the development of the Cornell-Ghana Project at Winneba Teacher 
Training College. In 1961, Ghana's Ministry of Education officially requested 
assistance from Cornell's Home Economics faculty in developing a post-secondary 
level curriculum for teachers. The project brought many Cornell faculty to Ghana to 
conduct an assessment for planning and staffing between 1962-1967. The Winneba 
Teacher Training College became the site for the project.76 
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 The Cornell-Winneba Project envisioned developing a 4-year home economics 
curriculum at the college level at Winneba Training College. The project also aimed to 
establish a Home Economics Department at the University of Ghana, Legon. The 
curriculum had the Ghanaian family unit as its central focus—the project trained 
teachers as leaders who could guide family members in raising their standard of 
living.77 Understanding the family system in Ghana would serve as a medium for 
women to adjust to Ghanaian society, which had experienced dramatic changes and was 
undergoing rapid agricultural and industrial expansion. The project, the combined work 
of the Winneba Training College, the New York State College of Home Economics, 
the University of Ghana, and the Ghanaian Ministry of Education materialized due to 
the interaction between the United States and Ghana. Financing the Cornell program 
became the major problem the project had to face at the initial stage. Although the 
United States made contributions to support the program, the amount provided was 
below the figure needed to facilitate the operation of the project. Funds from Cornell 
University, together with contributions from the Ghanaian government, made the 
program successful.78  
 In 1962, a plan for the project was drafted in Ghana and refined at Cornell. 
Cornell faculty visited Ghana to help set the project in motion. Professor Kathleen 
Rhodes and Harold Feldman made a short visit to Ghana. Rhodes had the quality to 
contribute towards expanding the Ghanaian education system. Born in Britain and 
having earned her doctoral degree at Cornell, she bore a clear understanding of both 
British and American education systems. Feldman from Cornell's Department of Child 
Family Studies led the development of contemporary studies of family practices. Based 
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on an earlier visit to Ghana in 1963, Feldman became convinced the country needed 
research centers at various places. He set out to construct the centers.79 The Peace Corps 
program made a significant impact. Most of the students developed an appreciation for 
the practicality of the skills they were learning in the classroom. Many of the students 
who enrolled in the home economics course had previous experience as teachers in the 
lower forms. Therefore, they were able to spread what they learned. In 1963, Feldman 
recommended that subjects in social sciences theory, marriage, and family be added to 
the Ghanaian curriculum. With these needed skills, students could contribute to the 
development of the new nation.80  
 Through the United States financial support, together with constant contact with 
various organizations in the United States, Ghanaians began to realize that the concepts 
of post-secondary education could be broadened to include more public service, 
extension education, and applied research.81 At the center of the new teacher training 
curriculum for home science at Winneba laid a deeper understanding of the Ghanaian 
family system. The introduction of a home science course foresaw training teachers 
who, through research and demonstration, would bring to their nation new practices in 
home management and children's development. Cornell University embraced the task 
of training teachers and preparing the research center for such a goal.82 Cornell 
University supported the transformation of the Ghanaian education system through the 
inclusion of home economics and agriculture studies as courses that prepared the 
Ghanaians mindset about the family system and planning together with agricultural 
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practices. The development of home management and rural life, which are tools for a 
modernized nation, materialized through the support of the United States university in 
launching Ghana towards modernization. 
The Status-Quo of Ghana's Education at the End of Nkrumah's Reign 
 By 1966 when the coup d' état overthrew Nkrumah, major transformations had 
taken place in the Ghanaian Public educational system through the United States' 
support. Many schools were built while the government had formerly absorbed most 
private schools. Compared to 1951, when the Educational Report recorded lesser than 
1,700 schools with about 226,000 pupils, the number increased to about 11,000 schools 
and 1.5 million pupils by 1966.83 The enrollment and number of schools figures  in 
1951 when Nkrumah took over increased substantially, with each educational level 
experiencing expansion. Between 1965-1966, university enrollment increased 20 times, 
while secondary school enrollment saw growth of 14 times the figures recorded in 1951. 
Primary and middle schools recorded seven- and four-times enrollment increments, 
respectively.84 
 Moreover, education had become tuition-free in all public education system, 
and the government provided free textbooks for all children schooled in the primary, 
middle, and secondary schools.85 Untrained teachers consisted of 65 percent of the total 
teachers at the elementary level by 1965, while expatriate and Peace Corps volunteers 
heavily dominated secondary schools in Ghana. University education as well expanded 
though partly due to the failure of the secondary schools to transform qualified 
graduates in science into the needed workforce for the country.86  
  
83George, Education in Ghana, 51. 
84George, Education in Ghana, 52. 
85George, Education in Ghana, 52. 
86George, Education in Ghana, 52. 
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 Ghana paid a heavy price for its educational success since the central 
government took the sole responsibility of sponsoring education and implementing 
policies to make the educational system work. By 1965, a total of 67 million cedis, 
which was 14 times that of 1951, was invested in the educational sector. The United 
States' support towards the launching of Ghana toward modernization contributed 
massively towards the expansion of the Ghanaian educational facilities, school 
enrollment, and the provision of teachers. The American Peace Corps program, together 
with the pivotal roles of Cornell University, transformed the Ghanaian education to the 
road of quality education by 1966.87 
  
The figure above represents the transition in enrollment status from 1951 to 1965-66.  
figure 1: Source: (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Office of Education, 1976),51. 
Conclusion 
 The Peace Corps' successes and challenges, together with the roles of Cornell 
University (U.S.A.), were examined in this chapter. The Peace Corps achieved its first 
stated goal: to serve the need of other countries. While it had not changed the entire 
globe by 1966, Ghana benefited immensely from the United States' contributions. The 
  
87George, Education in Ghana, 52. 
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United States support for Ghana ensured the success of the free education policy, 
increased enrollment, expanded the Ghanaian education system, increased the number 
of teacher training graduates, and increased the number of educational and non-
educational facilities. Moreover, through the efforts of Cornell University, Ghanaians 
were introduced to Home Economics as a course of study which restructured Ghanaians 
view about family structure and planning. 
 Nonetheless, the instituted program faced significant setbacks due to the rigid 
nature of the Ghanaian education system, the political environment in Ghana, 
volunteers' lack of teaching experience, and a low standard of living. Volunteers' 
commitment to contribute towards Ghana's educational system helped in transforming 
Ghana despite the series of challenges the United States-Ghanaian relations 
encountered.88 Ghana expanded and diversified the Peace Corps program to include 
other non-educational sectors to ensure economic and social developments in Ghana.89 
  
  
88Hoffman, All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s, 181-182. 
89United States. General Accounting Office, United States Programs in Ghana: Report to the Congress 
(Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1974), 31. 
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Ghanaian Trade Relations with The United States 
Ghana and the United States of America have maintained very peaceful trade 
relations over the years. The United States is the largest importer of Ghana 
cocoa. We, for our past, have, for a long time, obtained from the United States 
our principal imports of machinery, transport, equipment, fuel, and chemicals. 
These trade relations with the United States are significant to the U.S. I am sure 
that this exhibition will lead to the opening of further sources of trade and 
commerce between the two nations.1  
 -President Kwame Nkrumah, November 27, 1961, at the opening of 
the U.S. Trade Fair in Accra. 
Ghana's trade relations with the outside world date from the pre-colonial era 
when the colony was under British hegemony. In pre-colonial times, Ghanaians traded 
in various goods with North Africa through the Sahara Desert. They also traded with 
their immediate neighbors. Moreover, Ghanaians had been heavily involved in the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade from its beginnings in the sixteenth century to the nineteenth 
century. Ghanaians traded in several commodities, including gold, salt, ivory, slaves, 
and kola nuts. They transported large quantities of gold from their shores to England, 
Holland, America, France, Portugal, and later imported other products during the 
colonial days. Ashanti, a region rich in kola trees, emerged as a robust commercial 
power due to the massive demand for kola nuts.2   
 Nkrumah's emergence as the president of Ghana was a turning point in Ghana's 
relation with the outside world, particularly the United States. Nkrumah hoped to 
industrialize the new country, and this required new initiatives since Ghana had low 
  
 1John D. Leonard, ‘“Nkrumah Seeks to Industrialize Ghana and Diversify the Country’s Economy,” 
Foreign Commerce Weekly, December 25, 1961, 7. 
 2O Anasenchor, "Ghana’s Trade Relations with the United States of America: A Case Study of the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)," (PhD diss., University of Ghana, 2016), 41-42. 
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foreign investments and local capital. The new Ghanaian government worked at 
transforming the newly independent nation into a thriving center for industrial and 
agricultural activities. The government established business relations with both the free 
world and Sino-Soviet bloc countries as it worked to achieve its economic vision. Also, 
the new government's strategy in transforming the Ghanaian economy and trade 
relations had been to welcome foreign investors. Nkrumah hoped to maintain Ghanaian 
sovereignty while gaining support from both the East and West. In fact, Nkrumah 
swung back and forth between the West and East. He later became interested in 
establishing trade relations with the United States with the hope of using Ghana-
America trade relations to transform Ghana. Ghana depended heavily on the United 
States for most of its imports. Key American capitalists identified Ghana as a fertile 
region for business.3  
 Nkrumah admired the United States' stated ideology of allowing newly 
independent states to manage their own affairs. Such an approach aligned with 
Nkrumah's positive neutrality and non-alignment philosophy. The United States 
allowed citizens of developing countries to work on their own while Americans 
provided guidance. Nkrumah hoped Americans would offer guidance to Ghanaians as 
the former allows the latter to work on their own.4 He believed his vision of 
modernizing Ghana through trade in products and other trade relations could 
materialize primarily through the support of the United States.5 
  
 3Leonard, “Nkrumah seeks to Industrialize Ghana and Diversify the Country’s Economy,” 7. 
4American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “Speech by 
Osagyefo at the Opening of the United States Exhibition,” in Confidential U.S. State Department Central 
Files. Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs (henceforth IAFA), “Ghana 1960-January 1963,” [microform], 
eds. Lester, Robert. Lewis, Daniel (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2002),” reel P-
859. 
5John H. Johnson, “U.S. Trade Fair in Ghana: America holds First Exhibition in West Africa,” Ebony, 
Nov 1961, 36. 
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 Hitherto, the Ghanaian economy depended on agriculture, which employed 
more than half of the population and contributed towards small industries. Ghana's total 
dependence on agriculture contributed to the collapse of the economy and trade, 
following the fall in prices of cocoa and other agriculture products. 6  
 Ghana had access to the American market and increased her exports by millions 
of dollars per annum through trade with the United States. Both Americans and 
Europeans viewed Ghana's entry to the open market as a milestone towards becoming 
a modernized country.  Ghanaians worked at increasing production as their exports to 
the outside world increased through contact with America. Ghana prepared to 
modernize by partnering with a more prosperous country. Ghana's strong dependence 
on America, however, contributed to the fall in the Ghanaian trading system since 
America later lost hope in the economy and decided not to invest much in Ghana from 
the 1960s. 
 Trade created growth, and growth increased income, Nkrumah believed. Ghana 
would export cocoa, gold, timber, and diamond to the United States whiles America 
would, in return, export capital goods, consumer goods, and intermediate goods to 
Ghana. The growth of income through an increase in exports would assist the nation's 
transformation to modernization. The increment in exportation would help Ghana's 
economic growth and position the country to modernize. As various American firms 
traded with Ghana, trading activities increased, and the growth in trade helped in the 
modernization of Ghana's market system. Both small and large businesses grew, and 
the growth of businesses created economic opportunities for Ghanaians and prepared 
the country for modernization and a prosperous future.7 
  
6LaVerle Bennette Berry, Ghana: A Country Study, (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 
1994), 158. 
7Berry, Ghana: A Country Study, xxiii. 
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Though America sought to assist Ghana in its bid of modernization through 
trade, the United States also wanted to promote its own economic and political interests. 
Despite Nkrumah's tough attitude of not easily giving in to American trade policies and 
requests, the United States' trade relations with Ghana contributed massively towards 
the modernization of Ghana. In October 1959, the American embassy in Accra reported, 
"Our trade relations with Ghana, including access to raw materials produced in Ghana, 
are good. Our political relations with Ghana are friendly and fruitful."8 Unfortunately, 
the economy built through trade relations with the United States did not survive for 
many years. From the 1960s, there arose adverse changes in the economy which 
included the fall in cocoa prices and America's unwillingness to invest heavily in 
Ghana. The economic changes caused the Ghanaian economy to fall apart. The heavy 
debt Ghana incurred due to Nkrumah's investment in other African nations negatively 
affected Ghana's economy.9  
This chapter examines the Ghana-America trade relations by focusing on trade 
in products between the two nations and the American Trade Fair of 1961. The chapter 
discusses the United States Trade Fair in Ghana, an economic activity that strengthened 
trade in Ghana, and between the two nations. The study reveals the contributions 
America made towards Ghana in the field of businesses as a facet in transforming the 
newly independent country. Also, the study discusses the economic problems which 
Ghana faced from the 1960s following an increment in Ghana's debt and the fall in 
cocoa products. 
 
 
  
 8Ebere Nwaubani, The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960 (Rochester, N.Y.: 
University of Rochester Press, 2001), 143. 
9R.W. Apple Jr, “Ghana Struggles Under Burden of Nkrumah’s Debt,” New York Times, May 6, 1969, 
3. 
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Ghana's Foreign Trade Relations under Nkrumah's Regime 
 Ghana had all the necessary commodities for economic and international trade 
success by 1957 when it attained independence. The country had become the producer 
of about two-fifths of the world's cocoa, a status that she maintained for years. Ghana's 
position in the global production of cocoa made her the country with the highest per 
capita income in tropical Africa for about a decade before 1957. It chiefly depended on 
cocoa production to sustain its economy; hence the fall in cocoa prices from the 1960s 
negatively affected the Ghanaian economy. Ghana became self-sufficient in food and 
exported surplus due to its stable population of about 7 million and its vast fertile lands.  
The country also became abundant in tropical timber and a variety of minerals, 
including gold, diamond, bauxite, and manganese. For instance, the Ashanti 
Corporation's Gold Mine, located in Ghana, had become the richest Gold Mine 
corporation in the world by 1957.10   
 Nkrumah indicated that it was only after independence when Ghanaians began 
to fully control trading activities and had the power to negotiate, hence, he believed 
Ghanaians could not be blamed for the low trade output during the colonial era. His 
government aimed to diversify the Ghanaian economy beyond the reliance on cocoa to 
include the production and exportation of palm kernel, spices, coffee, rubber, and 
tobacco. Nkrumah foresaw the need to diversify since total dependence on a single 
product would collapse the economy once prices fall. Nkrumah announced that 
agricultural products, when produced, would be used to increase production in 
Ghanaian industries as the country worked to industrialize and modernize. Moreover, 
he explained to Ghanaians that the production of goods would increase the exportation 
  
 10David Williams, "The Ghana Economy," The World Today 22, (1966): 475-81.  
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to foreign countries like the United States. He further promoted Ghana's ability to 
export some agricultural products that have never been exported.11 
 Ghana's importation of consumer goods also increased during Nkrumah's 
regime from $106 million in 1958 to $150 million in 1960. Producer products increased 
from $58 to $118 million, with the total imports reaching about $400 million.12 These 
figures contradicted Nkrumah's ideology of non-alignment and positive neutrality. 
Nkrumah believed that political independence meant economic independence. 
Therefore, Nkrumah envisaged developing the doctrine of non-alignment in his trade 
relations, even as he grew closer to the West.13 At independence, Ghana's economy had 
proven to be better than any black African country, and Ghana's economy grew steadily 
over time. American investment in Ghana grew faster until the 1960s when America 
began to stop investing in Ghana due to the fall in the Ghanaian economy.14  
 Nkrumah's government adopted policies geared towards bringing in foreign 
private capital, and that strategy generated competition between foreign investors and 
domestic investors. New businesses that the Nkrumah government established had to 
compete with already existing banking, insurance, shipping, timber, construction, and 
manufacturing firms. Nkrumah's administration granted preferential treatment to 
government-owned industries.  Nevertheless, Nkrumah did not impose restrictions on 
the operations of foreign investors. The freedom he granted to foreign companies 
allowed international firms to continue to dominate the industrial sector. The 
  
11Kwame Nkrumah Africa Must Unite. (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1963), 109-110. 
12Steel F. William, Import Substitution and Excess Capacity in Ghana, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 1972), 6, cited in Anasenchor "Ghana’s Trade Relations with the United States of America: A 
Case Study of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)," 43. 
13William, "The Ghana Economy," 476. 
 14Johnson, “U.S. Trade Fair in Ghana: America holds First Exhibition in West Africa,” 28-9. 
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government only nationalized the sales of timber and the private transactions of cocoa, 
Ghana's primary export product.15 
 Nkrumah, being desperate to modernize Ghana through trade, decided to open 
up to the Soviets and the United States concurrently. When Clarence Randall, formerly 
of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, learned of Nkrumah’s action, he 
questioned Nkrumah’s new trade partnership with the Soviets and he argued that 
Nkrumah did not understand the implications of Ghana’s trading relationship with the 
Soviets. Nkrumah replied in a press release citing his discussions with Khrushchev and 
asserting he was not ready to compromise Ghana’s neutrality with any country. 
Nkrumah announced he would demonstrate Ghana’s neutrality if the West would give 
him a chance.16  
Nkrumah's Major Challenges 
  Ghana's economic relations and trade operations faced three major setbacks 
after independence. Ghana suffered due to lack of skilled workforce meant to replace 
foreign investors with local enterprises. Nkrumah wanted to ensure Ghanaians would 
take over trade operations. Nonetheless, this project came to naught due to the lack of 
competent personnel in Ghana.17 Secondly, the country faced a challenge from the 
limited capacity of Ghanaian private and public firms to create industrial investments. 
Direct investment from foreign private enterprises became the sole external source for 
industrial capital in Ghana between 1957-1960. Nkrumah and his advisers hoped 
dependence on foreign investors would reduce overtime. Meanwhile, they depended on 
foreign investors to build a new economy.  Nkrumah believed that restricting foreign 
  
 15John D. Esseks, "Political Independence and Economic Decolonization: The Case of Ghana under 
Nkrumah," Western Political Quarterly 24 (1971): 59-64. 
16Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United 
States,1957-1966,” 168. 
17Esseks, "Political independence and economic decolonization: the case of Ghana under 
Nkrumah," 60. 
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investors would make it difficult for the Ghanaian system to attract foreign companies. 
By the 1960s, Ghana continued to depend on foreign investors and the Ghanaian 
economy collapsed when foreign investors began to lose interest in investing heavily 
in Ghana.18  
              Thirdly, Nkrumah's administration also suffered from the division between 
Nkrumah's ideology and that of the majority party. Nkrumah and the majority party 
debated over whether corporate or private firms should be the main benefactors in the 
new nation. Nkrumah preferred a socialist state as he envisaged state control over the 
economic sector of the new country. Besides, he feared the rise of an efficient capitalist 
industry would hamper his political agenda. Nkrumah once told a Cabinet Minister, 
Kojo Botsio, that if any Ghanaian possessed a significant amount of money, the person 
would have much influence. Nkrumah believed influential Ghanaians would be 
dangerous to his political career. Nkrumah thought that foreign investors who had no 
background in Ghana posed no threat to him since such people could not gain political 
influence. Perhaps, if Ghana had built a capitalist economy, private firms would have 
saved the country from the disastrous economy it faced from the 1960s.19 
Potential Trade relations between Ghana-America 
 Nkrumah visited the United States in 1958 for trade discussions aimed at 
winning America's support to help build the Ghanaian trade system. He toured New 
York for the first time since his time as a student in America 23 years before. Nkrumah 
delivered a speech regarding Ghana's economic prospects to business groups and 
various organizations. He emphasized that Ghana's relations with America would 
contribute to the diversification of the Ghanaian economy from dependence on the 
  
18Esseks, "Political independence and economic decolonization: the case of Ghana under Nkrumah," 
60. 
19Esseks, "Political independence and economic decolonization: the case of Ghana under Nkrumah," 
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cocoa beans. Nkrumah’s goal of diversifying the Ghanaian economy did not happen. 
During his speech, Nkrumah informed the National Foreign Trade Council about 
Ghana's willingness to establish an investment agreement with America to protect its 
investors. He went ahead and discussed Ghana’s commerce, and his intention to partner 
with the United States for trade in products and industrialization. Nkrumah jokingly 
told Americans, “You are not drinking enough cocoa in this country.” He emphasized 
Ghana’s intent to send more cocoa and other agricultural products to the United States 
as Ghana partners with America in trade. He indicated that Ghana would expand its 
cocoa production with the hope that the country would gain market shares from 
American trade. Nkrumah stated that the total amount of cocoa planted, harvested, and 
exported by Ghanaian farmers would be dependent on the United States' level of foreign 
exchange in Ghana.20  
 Henry Kearns, the United States Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
International Affairs, reported that the United States hoped American business with 
Ghana would grow. American trade with Ghana showed the readiness of the United 
States to support Ghana. American traders developed an interest in trading with Ghana 
as American capitalists sought a new region for investment. American capitalists 
decided to deposit their surplus capital and products in Ghana. The United States' 
foreign policy attempted to help Ghana launch towards modernization. Americans 
believed that modernized nations would be less susceptible to communist influence.21 
United States Trade Fair in Accra, Ghana 
 The United States Government Scholarship program sponsored the Trade Fair 
organized in Accra, Ghana, from November 24 to December 24, 1961. The fair sought 
  
20 Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United 
States,1957-1966,” 88. 
 21Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in 
the Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 83,157. 
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to demonstrate potential trade relations between the two countries. The fair also aimed 
at strengthening the bond between the two nations for trade in products, techniques, and 
equipment exchange. Americans who worked in the fashion industry and unions used 
the Trade Fair as an opportunity to market American products.22 On January 30, 1961, 
Representative Charles Coles Diggs Jr., an African American and United States 
congressman, sent a letter to C. Yaughn Ferguson, Jr., Assistant Secretary on West 
African Affairs. Diggs requested further information on the international Fair expected 
to take place in Ghana in November 1961. Specifically, Diggs asked for information 
about the United States participation in the event, the personnel needed for the 
American exhibitions, and the method to use in selecting staff for the American 
exhibition. Congress collaborated with Ghana even at the preparatory stage, with the 
hope of maximizing profit from the contact with Ghana while supporting the newly 
independent nation towards its transformation.23  
 The site and the date of the occasion became the next subject for discussion. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Embassy concluded that the Trade Fair 
would take place in November right after the Queen of England's visit to Ghana. State 
officials had concluded that the Queen would visit Ghana in 1961, though the exact 
date remained unknown. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would confirm the date for 
the Trade Fair provided the chosen site would be available for the event on the 
scheduled date. The Ghana Educational Trust owned the amphitheater site, the field 
selected for the Trade Fair. The Ministry of Education financed the Ghana Educational 
  
 22Maida Springer to Mr. Julius Hechman, Vice President International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 
“Trade Fair in Ghana, Accra,” August 29, 1961, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Country 
Files (hereafter AFL-CIO IADCF), 1945-1971, Box 10, University of Maryland Libraries Special 
Collections and Archives. 
23American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961 “Address of 
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Trust, a semi-governmental institution. The government indicated its readiness to use 
any recommended site for the event because of the importance of the Trade Fair as a 
steppingstone towards America's support to Ghana through trade interactions.24  
 The United States organized the Trade Fair to promote trade and tighten the 
trade connections between Ghana and the United States. The program organizers added 
exhibitions that benefited Ghana's commercial, economic, and industrial development. 
Moreover, the exhibitions created an avenue to advertise the significance of small 
industries and businesses in the American economy.  Trade Fair exhibitions showcased 
the pivotal roles of the United States' small industries. The fair’s slogan was, "Small 
industries are big business." The idea of promoting small businesses in Ghana and 
emphasizing their roles in boosting the economy became the driving force behind the 
fair. Small businesses in America had contributed massively towards the national 
economy. Smaller firms in America amounted to less than 50 percent of all United 
States' industries. However, the smaller firms produced one-third of all manufactured 
goods in America. Smaller firms also accounted for one-half of all wholesale products 
in America. The Trade Fair highlighted the roles of smaller firms in boosting the 
American economy. The fair inspired Ghanaians to believe smaller firms had a role to 
play in modernizing Ghana through trade.  
 The American Embassy in Accra partnered with the Ghanaian press and printed 
the Trade Fair program for circulation. The printed program detailed how the United 
States controlled its economy, income distribution, and growth of businesses. The 
printed paper also explained the division of share ownership in American institutions 
by low and middle-income people. These ideas would help Ghanaians and the 
  
24American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, May 22, 1961, “Ghana Solo 
Exhibit: Survey of OITF Designer,” IAFA, reel P- 748. 
  
 95 
  
government in the transformation of the new country's economy through trade. 
Ghanaians gained insight into how America had sustained its economy over the years. 
Ghanaians then translated the ideas into practice, boosted their trading system, and 
moved closer until the economy deteriorated in the late 1960s.25 
 Thomas P. Rock, a 38-years old African American, born in Brooklyn, became 
the designer for the American trade exhibition. His close relations with Ghana 
contributed towards the success of the fair. Rock's connection to his African ancestry 
might have contributed to his commitment and dedication to an African country. He 
had studied industrial design at Pratt Institute in New York. Rock, a man of attractive 
personality, received the offer to design the Trade Fair with pride and puzzlement. The 
Office of International Trade Fairs' spokesperson believed Rock got the offer because 
of his ability not because he was a person of color. In March 1961, Charles Clarke, the 
deputy chief of design and construction of the Office of International Trade Fairs, called 
Rock and discussed the design contract with him. Clarke offered Rock the opportunity 
to design the Trade Fair in Accra, Ghana. Rock showed interest in the offer. Hitherto, 
the Creative Playthings Incorporation in New Jersey had employed Rock as a designer 
and production supervisor. Mr. Rock received an offer letter from Clarke two days after 
they discussed the contract. Clarke detailed the needs and purposes of the Trade Fair in 
the contract letter. After a few weeks, Rock traveled to Washington and discussed the 
Trade Fair with State Department officials.  Already, Rock had gained experience by 
designing American sponsored Trade Fairs in Poland, Greece, Russia, and Sweden.26 
 The American government's invitation of Rock to plan the Ghana Trade Fair 
created the path for the formation of the new industrial enterprise of Tysinger/Rock 
  
 25American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “President 
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Associates Incorporation. Burton Tysinger, an architect, and industrial planner from 
North Carolina became Rock's cooperator. When Rock landed in Ghana, he observed a 
modern warehouse building. Rock described Ghana as not only undeveloped but 
backward as well. Yet he commended Ghanaians for their intelligence and asserted that 
Ghana's economic development had been rapid towards progress. He believed 
Ghanaians' intelligence would accelerate Ghana's modernization through trade. Rock 
assisted the new country in transforming its economy into a modernized one. His 
nationality did not influence his attraction to Ghana nor his desire towards the 
industrialization of the country. The Ghanaian habit of hospitality and energy attracted 
Rock. His desire to contribute towards modernizing Ghana through trade relations 
increased in a short time. Rock recommended the types of exhibits he thought would 
be useful in Ghana, mainly exhibits on light planes, computers, and motorboats.  
 Rock contributed immensely towards the Trade Fair after thoroughly studying 
the Ghanaian social-economic system. The Trade Fair strengthened trade between 
Ghana and America and taught Ghanaians new techniques and technology to build their 
economy through trade. Moreover, the fair that Rock designed highlighted the role of 
small businesses in a country's economy. Francis H. Russell, the American Ambassador 
in Accra, during his speech at the Trade Fair opening, reported that the food and fiber 
showcased at the fair were products from the private and cooperative businesses in the 
United States while the various machines were from the small firms in America.27 The 
fair promoted the operation of private firms and smaller businesses in Ghana.28 
  
27American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 16, 1961, “President’s 
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28Johnson, “U.S. Trade Fair in Ghana: America holds First Exhibition in West Africa,” 34. 
  
 97 
  
Ghanaians showed great interest in the fair because they believed America supported 
the launch of Ghana as a developed nation through trade assistance.29  
 The Ghana Educational Trust chairman optimistically forecasted that the 
United States Trade Fair would be the most significant fair ever to be organized in 
Ghana. America's desire to support Ghana signaled through the attention given to the 
preparation of the Trade Fair. Concurrently, the Republic of China envisaged 
organizing a rival trade show in Ghana in either the month of August or September 
1961. China hoped to demonstrate industrial development under a communist regime. 
An official of the Ghanaian Trade Ministry wanted the United States' Trade Fair to 
surpass that of Chinese. Therefore, he gave an American embassy officer a draft of the 
Chicom fair proposal to alert the United States about the strength of the Chinese 
intended show. The Ghanaian trade official's action indicates Ghana's preference for 
American-style modernization. Ghanaians showed this preference despite the intense 
growth of nationalistic activities and the growth of the Soviets' influence.30 
  Americans perceived the Trade Fair as the most significant attempt to 
showcase America to Ghanaians. The Trade Fair also became the medium to counter 
the Soviet's economic and cultural influence in Ghana. The show needed to be 
successful in improving the United States' position in Ghana. The Trade Fair became 
the stage for America to prove itself to Ghanaians since both the Soviets and America 
rallied behind building the Ghanaian trade system. Ghanaian officials and the United 
States Embassy wanted the Trade Fair exhibit to include cocoa processing exhibits. 
Americans consumed enormous amounts of cocoa products, and Ghana was the largest 
producer of cocoa beans. America's purchase of Ghanaian cocoa contributed 
  
29American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, May 22, 1961, “Ghana Solo 
Exhibit: Survey of OITF Designer,” IAFA, reel P- 748. 
30American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, May 22, 1961, “Ghana Solo 
Exhibit: Survey of OITF Designer,” IAFA, reel P-748. 
  
 98 
  
significantly towards building the Ghanaian trade system, of which cocoa had been the 
primary product. Moreover, the Embassy believed there must be an exhibition to 
showcase the growth of the United States in the housing field.31  
 Richard Erstein, director of the United States Information Service, counseled 
that Americans should promote the Trade Fair in a proper perspective.  The Trade Fair 
should help Ghanaians to understand the trading system and capitalize on it to build 
their trade system. He also advised that Americans should not use a film of President 
Kennedy's inauguration because it presents people of color as inferior. The film showed 
segregated audiences and relegated people of color as inferior beings to white. Erstein 
recommended instead, exhibits should showcase racial cooperation in the United States 
and high living standards for people of color in America. Americans believed any traits 
of racism would tarnish their image in Ghana. America desired to use every possible 
means to showcase itself as a country to win the heart of Ghanaians while supporting 
them in building up its trade system.32 
 It had been the utmost desire of the American government to ensure stronger 
trade relations between Ghana and the United States. Russell announced that the fair 
would serve as a tool to strengthen the bond between the United States and Ghana.  
Firms in the United States represented at the Trade Fair included the International 
Division of United States Industries, Rocks International Corporation, Great Northern 
Overseas Cooperative, Reese Associates Incorporation, and Miller Sewer Rod 
Company. American firms that attended the fair produced the latest sewage, sinks, 
handy lavatory tools, lawn mowers, cars, electronic manufactured products, plants, and 
machinery. Enterprises that attended the fair also produced Frick sawmills and 
  
31American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, May 22, 1961, “Ghana Solo 
Exhibit: Survey of OITF Designer,” IAFA, reel P-748. 
32American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, May 30, 1961, “List of U.S. Firms 
Being Represented,” IAFA, reel P-779. 
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equipment, summer bandsaws, and equipment, Dorsey's low-beds trailers, cattle vans, 
refrigeration vans, Unistrut metal frames, and partitions. These companies traded in 
Ghana with the hope of maximizing profits while building the Ghanaian trading system 
to boost the economy.33  
President Nkrumah Officially Opens the United States Trade Fair in Ghana 
 On November 27, 1961, President Nkrumah formerly launched the United 
States Trade Fair in the presence of about 1,000 seniors of diplomatic corps, industry, 
agriculture, trade, and the Ghanaian government. Tawia Adamafio, Minister of 
information and broadcasting, Kwaku Boateng, Minister of Interior, L. R. Abavana, 
and F.K.D Goka, Minister of Trade and Finance, all attended the launching of the Fair. 
About 18,609 people attended on November 28, while about 20,320 attended on 
November 29. Many Ghanaians had to climb the fence to have a taste of the exhibitions. 
The total attendance of 38,929 reported for the first two days outnumbered the entire 
population of Accra, Ghana's capital, where the event took place. The total number of 
people who attended the Fair for the first two days indicates Ghanaians’ eagerness to 
learn new techniques and transform their economy. Nkrumah generally avoided 
attending such events in the preceding years. He turned down many invitations to 
participate in the opening ceremonies of Trade Fairs that the Soviets funded in Accra 
before the United States Trade Fair. However, Nkrumah conspicuously attended the 
United States Trade Fair.  The priority he gave to the United States in his bid to 
modernize Ghana influenced his decision to attend the launch of the American Fair. 
  
33American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 16, 1961, “President’s 
Office desires text Statement by U.S. Rep Occasion Official Opening Trade Fair to Facilitate Drafting 
Appropriate Response,” IAFA, reel P- 840. 
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Nkrumah had been optimistic about the United States' support in building the country's 
trade system; hence he prioritized the American Trade Fair.34 
 During his speech, President Nkrumah announced that Ghana was “Against any 
form of discrimination in economic matters” due to Ghana’s policy of non-alignment 
and positive neutrality.35 Nkrumah told attendees at the Trade Fair that “We make no 
apology for the steps we have taken recently to strengthen our trade and economic 
relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China.” He reported to Ghanaians 
and the outside world that Ghana sought to use diverse means to achieve rapid 
industrialization and mechanization of Ghana’s agriculture and to transform the 
Ghanaian economy.36 
 Nkrumah actively engaged in the opening ceremonies for the fair. He spent two 
hours with his senior ministers touring 33 exhibit centers during the United States Trade 
Fair. During his tour, he exclaimed, "This is the first time that I have spent such a long 
time at a Trade Fair." The presence of Nkrumah made the United States Trade Fair 
distinctive.37 Nkrumah expressed his excitement as he observed the exhibitions in 
Ghana. He informed the American ambassador, a Kaiser representative, Department of 
Commerce Officials, and other individuals that he would come back for another visit. 
As he toured the exhibit centers, he inquired about the background of the Ghanaian 
demonstrators with the hope of knowing how long they had undergone training for the 
exhibition. Nkrumah became overwhelmed with two demonstrators who had not 
  
 34American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “President 
Nkrumah Opens United States Trade Fair,” IAFA, reel P- 854. 
 35American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “President 
Nkrumah Opens United States Trade Fair,” IAFA, reel P- 855. 
 36American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “President 
Nkrumah Opens United States Trade Fair,” IAFA, reel P- 855. 
 37American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “President 
Nkrumah Opens United States Trade Fair,” IAFA, reel P- 854. 
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received any prior training except the four days of teaching. The fact that Ghanaians 
developed the capability to operate the exhibits after only a few days of training showed 
their potential to build the Ghanaian economy through trading activities.  Ghanaians 
needed American support to build the trading system. Nkrumah perceived Ghanaians 
demonstration of the exhibitions as a mark of Ghana's road to modernizing its trade 
industry through the support of the United States. He became optimistic that Ghanaians 
who receive few days of training from Americans would contribute towards 
modernization. Ghanaians' enthusiasm and ability to demonstrate what Americans had 
taught them meant that with limited guidance, Ghanaians would be on track to 
modernize their nation. At a point during his tour, Nkrumah told Tawia Adamafio, 
minister of Information and Broadcasting, that the government could establish a 
training institution in Ghana using the techniques and tools demonstrators utilized. For 
Nkrumah, the exhibition showed real potential for trade and commerce between Ghana 
and the United States, which would contribute to transforming Ghana.38  
 Various firms manufactured houseware items during the exhibition. The Trade 
Fair included cocoa industries exhibits. The cocoa exhibits taught Ghanaians how 
Americans used cocoa, their number one export product in producing chocolate and 
cocoa butter. Ghanaians developed insights into processing the cocoa beans in Ghana 
into a finish product, and that boosted the Ghanaian economy. Unfortunately, Ghana’s 
dependence on cocoa led to a decline of the Ghanaian economy when cocoa prices fell. 
The fall in cocoa prices affected cocoa products thereby leading to the fall of Ghana’s 
economy in the 1960s.39   
  
 38American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “President 
Nkrumah Opens United States Trade Fair,” IAFA, reel P- 855. 
39Johnson, “U.S. Trade Fair in Ghana: America holds First Exhibition in West Africa,” 34.  
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 At the fair, Ghanaians encountered new products, purchased various items, 
established networking with private enterprises, and learned from the exhibitions. The 
presence of the various private firms at the Trade Fair showed the role of private 
organizations in Ghana-America relations. The American private firms contributed to 
shaping the Ghanaian trading system as they produced goods and sent them to Ghana 
for sale. Moreover, the United States private companies trained Ghanaians for the 
exhibition exercise with the hope that Ghanaians would use the techniques to build their 
industries. Besides, the presence of the various private firms made Nkrumah reconsider 
his view of private companies. He now believed private firms had a pivotal role to play 
in his vision of modernizing Ghana. Therefore, he began to prioritize such private firms 
in national affairs.40 
 The Trade Fair marked a moment of showcasing the attraction of new and 
significant American investments in Ghana. Over 31 countries attended the exhibition, 
and their presence advertised available opportunities in Ghana to the outside world. The 
exhibition showed the interest the American government and business people had in 
trading with the new African country. The Trade Fair increased the imagination of 
Ghanaians and stirred up the economic relationship between America and Ghana. The 
exhibition established a practical, do-it-yourself spirit, which demonstrated the 
American style of helping new countries that seek to achieve economic progress. The 
Trade Fair education exhibition became the most practical to the Ghanaian industrial 
context. The training taught Ghanaians many industrial skills meant to equip them in 
building their new nation. About 130 students, mostly young individuals, attended the 
  
 40American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1961, “President 
Nkrumah Opens United States Trade Fair,” IAFA, reel P- 855. 
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fair to learn from many courses, including electronic courses.41 For years after 
independence, America contributed towards Ghana's modernization agenda.42  
Trade Relations and Investment in Ghana at the end of Nkrumah's Reign 
 Nkrumah's government begun to fall apart five years preceding his overthrow. 
His grand economic plans for Ghana and Africa, in general, landed Ghana in debt. 
Nkrumah failed to use the funds generated from Ghana's trade revenue to focus on the 
new country's modernization. Ghana became overburdened with debt due to Nkrumah's 
numerous activities in different parts of Africa. He expanded his vision to assist other 
African countries, including Congo. He wanted to use Ghana's income to support his 
Pan-African vision of creating the United States of Africa and modernizing the entire 
African continent. These high hopes fatally burdened his vision of transforming Ghana 
through trade. Nkrumah's high trade expectations never materialize in Ghana. The 
refusal of the C.P.P. government to increase the minimum wage of workers lowered the 
standard of living and sparked mass demonstrations in Kumasi, Accra, and Sekondi-
Takoradi. Between 1960-1965, average wage levels fell by twenty percent in the private 
sector while the public sector decreased by forty percent.43 
 Ghana paid a heavy price as she strived to achieve economic independence. The 
economical price the new country paid for modernization contributed significantly to 
the collapse of Nkrumah's government in early 1966. The country struggled with a high 
external economic debt in state-owned industries and the debt accumulated through 
cargo ships that Western nations and Communist blocs financed. The debt outstripped 
the Ghanaian economy, and Nkrumah's government negotiated with foreign creditors 
  
 41American Embassy Accra to The Department of State, Washington, December 7, 1961, 
“Businessmen’s Day at the U.S. Trade Fair,” IAFA, reel P-867. 
 42Johnson, “U.S. Trade Fair in Ghana: America holds First Exhibition in West Africa,” 27. 
43Naaborko Sackeyfio-Lenoch, “The Ghana Trades Union Congress and the Politics of International 
Labor Alliances, 1957-1971,” International Review of Social History, 62 (2017): 191-213. 
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to reschedule payments by December 1965. Nkrumah initially envisaged a reduction of 
foreign influence in the manufacturing and shipping of products. However, his 
government ended up opening the entire economy to more considerable international 
control. Foreign creditors began demanding economic policies that would favor the 
rescheduling of their credit payments. Ghana could no longer have absolute control 
over trading activities in Ghana.44  
 The total debt the Nkrumah government left became challenging since Ghana 
depended strongly on the agriculture economy. While cocoa exports to the United 
States and other places could have improved the economic situation, cocoa began to 
lose its share value on the market, though Ghana continued to be the largest producer 
of cocoa. Some Ghanaians attributed the decline in cocoa value to lousy weather 
conditions. Cocoa farmers' morale fell because of the economic situation in Ghana. 
Besides, farmers lacked the money to afford replanting, new technology, or 
insecticides. Ghana's economic dependence on cocoa and the fall in cocoa price 
severely burdened the Ghanaian economy. After Nkrumah was overthrown, the United 
States still maintained trade relations with Ghana with the hope of contributing to 
Ghana’s economy, but the Ghanaian trade system declined.45  
Conclusion 
  This chapter examined the United States' trade relations with Ghana and how 
the trade relations contributed towards modernizing Ghana. America-Ghana relations 
granted the United States access to Ghana's cocoa, gold, diamond, timber, cotton, coal, 
petroleum products, fats and oils, and others. Ghana also imported American finished 
goods. Nkrumah remained reluctant to ally more with the United States in Ghana's trade 
  
 44Esseks, "Political independence and economic decolonization: the case of Ghana under Nkrumah," 59-
64. 
45Apple, “Ghana Struggles Under Burden of Nkrumah’s Debt,” 3. 
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relations due to the continuing concerns that the American C.I.A. had created in some 
developing countries. Nevertheless, he allowed the United States to trade with Ghana, 
and America organized the largest Trade Fair ever in Ghana. The Trade Fair granted 
Americans an opportunity to sell their products. At the same time, Ghanaians had the 
privilege to learn new skills through various exhibitions. American groups and 
individual traders visited Ghana frequently during the nation's first decade. 
Unfortunately, the poor economic conditions in Ghana that emerged at the end of 
Nkrumah's reign began to deteriorate America-Ghana trade relations. After Nkrumah 
was overthrown, America's interest in promoting trading activities in Ghana drastically 
declined, and no measure could quickly recuperate American investment. Today, 
America and Ghana have good trade relations, with each supporting the other to 
develop its economy. 
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Conclusion 
 Ghana became the first country to gain independence in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As a nation that sought to achieve modernization, Ghana swung back and forth in its 
relations with the West and East. The newly independent government envisaged 
positive neutrality and non-alignment, but it still related to both the East and West. 
Ghanaians believed independence meant to be free from all forms of foreign 
dominations.  However, Ghanaians thought modernization depended on support from 
foreign powers. Hence, Ghana's alliance with the United States ensured the 
development of industrialization, educational expansion, and trade expansion. As a 
baby in the woods, Ghana depended on the United States' support in launching itself 
towards the vision of modernization. 
 Ghana experienced significant challenges and development in its 
transformation from a colonial state, to an independent state, and to a Republic. The 
newly independent nation transformed from total dependence on Great Britain into an 
interactive relationship with the United States. Kwame Nkrumah, the first prime 
minister and president of Ghana, played an instrumental role in the United States' 
relations with Ghana. He initially showed skepticism toward the United States relations. 
Nevertheless, Nkrumah came to believe his vision of modernizing Ghana could only 
materialize through American support. Ghana's position as the first country to gain 
independence in Sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with Nkrumah's charismatic personality, 
spurred the desire of both Europeans and Americans to establish a relationship with 
Ghana. His experience as a student in both London and the United States prepared 
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Nkrumah to work with America. Nkrumah's political connections in London made 
America believe that Nkrumah understood the Western system and could work 
efficiently with the United States.1 
 Ghana plunged into a series of difficulties as the leader of the independence 
movement in Africa. Immediately after independence, tribal rivalries began weakening 
the unity of the new nation that had stood and fought consistently against the common 
enemy, Britain. The demise of the common enemy now created territorial rivalries 
among the various tribes, especially those in northern Ghana. Externally, Ghana faced 
the challenge of international relations with the United States. Ghana had proclaimed 
non-alignment and positive neutrality from day one of its post-independence eras. 
However, the vision of modernization made Ghana swung back and forth with both the 
East and West.2     
 The United States' relationship with Ghana emerged out of Ghana's pursuit of 
America's support. United States-Ghanaian relations became heavily influenced by 
personal relationships between statesmen as opposed to a relationship wholly centered 
on national ideology or economic interest. The bond began from the 1950s with the 
United States' desire to pursue its Cold War agenda in Ghana. American-Soviets’ 
competition elevated the importance of Ghana as the newest prize since both powers 
sought to penetrate Africa. Soviets communist’s interest in Africa prompted the United 
States' earlier relations with Ghana. President Eisenhower encouraged American-
Ghanaian relations by sending Vice President Nixon to Ghana's Independence Day 
ceremony in 1957. Later, Eisenhower invited President Nkrumah to the White House. 
However, due to continued tensions and conflicts in the Middle East and Southeast 
  
1Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United States, 
1957-1966,” 223.  
2Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United States, 
1957-1966,” 224. 
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Asia, Eisenhower's administration gave little attention to Africa.3 Nkrumah's policy of 
non-alignment displayed Ghana's strength. The new nation demonstrated the ability to 
manage its affairs as it simultaneously worked to avoid participation in international 
conflict.4 
 Nkrumah focused on building the Ghanaian economy, which depended on its 
relations with the United States. Nkrumah's ability to ensure a stable government 
prompted the United States to provide Ghana with the needed support. America 
supported the Volta River scheme, provided volunteers for the Peace Corps program, 
and developed trade relations with Ghana. Ghana required America's support to 
construct the hydroelectric project. Kennedy's assumption to power galvanized Ghana 
towards modernization. Kennedy was interested in Africa; hence, he established a 
strong personal relationship with Nkrumah over time. The Volta River Project became 
a means which Nkrumah sought to industrialize the new nation towards the path to its 
economic growth. Most Americans had no problem with his non-alignment policy once 
Nkrumah maintained a stable government. American statesmen had declared non-
alignment an acceptable ideology for newly independent states. Nkrumah completed 
the project before his overthrow in 1966. He gained financial support from America 
through his relations with Kennedy though the Volta scheme faced numerous 
challenges on its road to completion. 
 Moreover, Nkrumah's vision of building the Ghanaian education system to 
launch Ghana towards modernization materialized with the assistance of the Peace 
Corps program during Kennedy’s administration. Besides, through the effort of Cornell 
University in New York, the Ghanaian education system and family life transformed. 
  
3Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United States, 
1957-1966,” 226-7.  
4Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United States, 
1957-1966,” 227. 
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By 1966, enrollment and educational facilities had increased compared to 1951. United 
States' Peace Corps volunteers and Cornell University faculty posted to Ghana deserve 
credit. Volunteers contributed to the expansion of the Ghanaian education system 
through their service as teachers and in other extra-curricular activities.  
 Ghana and the United States also continued to have trade relations over the 
years. The two countries exchange goods and services as each sought to improve 
economic ties. America depended on Ghana for resources such as cocoa and gold 
whereas Ghana also depended on America for finished products. The United States 
organized the biggest Trade Fair in Ghanaians’ history, where exhibitions successfully 
showcased the potential for trade between the two nations. Ghanaians received a few 
days of training for operating the demonstrations, even so, they easily operated 
equipment. Private firms contributed to the exhibitions meant to transform the 
Ghanaian trade system during the Trade Fair. Americans taught Ghanaians how to 
process cocoa, Ghana's main exported product into the finished product. The 
exhibitions demonstrated new skills for Ghanaians. Moreover, the fair pinpointed the 
role of smaller businesses in the American economy and encouraged positive Ghanaian 
sentiments towards small enterprises. It is noteworthy that Ghana-America relations 
went beyond state-to-state ties to individuals and organizations interacting with Ghana. 
The personal relationship between the various statesmen played a pivotal role in 
enhancing a smooth relationship amidst multiple challenges.5  
 Over the years, tensions in both Ghana and the United States challenged the 
United States' relations with Ghana. In Ghana, an anti-American campaign emerged in 
the 1960s as riots broke out in Accra, spurred by Ghanaians who thought Americans 
  
5Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United States, 
1957-1966,” 227-228. 
  
 110 
  
had monopolized their nation's social, economic, and political systems. Also, the 
Ghanaian press attacked America and its statesmen for their policies in Africa during 
the Cold War. Nkrumah, who had sought United States support, presented a deeper 
hurdle as he swung back and forth in his non-alignment policy. Nkrumah and his close 
associates became embittered following Lumumba's death in early 1961 and blamed 
the West for its role in the Congo crisis and the assassination of Lumumba.  
 Nkrumah's alignment with the East envenomed the United States Congress. 
Besides, the Ghanaian press attacks on America had drawn the attention of the U.S. 
Congress, which moved to withdraw America's support from Ghana. The United States 
continued to respond by threatening to withdraw its support from the Volta River 
scheme. Congress’ aware of Nkrumah's desire to complete the project, hoped that 
threatening to withdraw America's funds would make Nkrumah and Ghanaians rescind 
their position towards the East.6  President Eisenhower's administration introduced the 
Cold War to Ghana, while Kennedy increased its significance. Under President 
Johnson, the Cold War overshadowed all diplomatic policies.7   
 Nkrumah became one of the most successful leaders in Africa, although his 
concept of the African Union never materialized. He received aid from both the West 
and East for Ghana. Nkrumah's connection with Kennedy granted Ghana favorable 
support from America. Kennedy became determined to help the "Third World" break 
the shackles of poverty and wanted to use Ghana as a model for the other African 
countries. Kennedy hoped Nkrumah would use Ghana's resources to create an 
industrialized nation. Nkrumah contributed massively to the building of a new Ghana 
even though an appraisal of his activities in Ghana and Africa could contain some 
  
6Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United States, 
1957-1966,” 228-9. 
7Montgomery, “The Eyes of the World Were Watching: Ghana, Great Britain, and The United States, 
1957-1966,” 230. 
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criticisms. Nkrumah wanted to create a political system centered on African socialism 
that could obtain support from both the West and East without shifting totally to one 
side. He wanted a system that would benefit Ghanaians by transforming the new nation 
into a modernized country. Nkrumah sought the assistance of Kennedy and 
Khrushchev, leaders of capitalism and communism, respectively, to help Africans. He 
came close to achieving this dream. Nkrumah's most significant weakness had been that 
most of his visions had little reality. Nkrumah had bigger ambitions, especially about 
the amalgamation of the African states into one state8  
 Ghanaians sought to use the vacuum the Cold War created to develop the new 
country. However, America and the East had sought to use the Cold War to expand 
their influence. Both state-to-state and private organizations interacted with individuals 
and companies moving to Ghana to support the modernizing of the newly independent 
nation. Today, Ghanaians celebrate Nkrumah for his achievements and relations with 
the outside world. Ghanaians recognized September 21, the birthday of Nkrumah as a 
national holiday and commemorate each year with numerous activities. The whole of 
Africa celebrates Nkrumah's vision and achievements. Africans remember his effort 
towards the creation of a United Africa, though that vision could not work.  
 The Ghanaian American relation, as the study has set out to show, had its ups 
and downs. This study focused on the Cold War era, a moment when Ghana had 
prioritized its independence and declared positive neutrality and non-alignment. The 
Soviets' relations with Ghana needs attention due to their interactions with Ghana 
during the Cold War. The Ghanaian-American connection today is still a topic 
deserving of more research. Issues such as military relations, other economic policies, 
and political relations need maximum details. Another detailed study could uncover the 
  
8Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World, 267-268. 
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United States relations with other regions in Africa. Besides, the United States relations 
with Ghana in the post-Nkrumah era should also be studied.  
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